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Abstract 
 
Growing franchise systems are admired and rewarded favorably by press, seen as 
“growth engines” in investor stock portfolios, and attract significant interest from 
potential franchisees. Yet growth brings with it the specter of intra-brand competition, 
and its attendant ill effect of sharply reducing the motivation of franchisees – the very 
drivers of such growth. Facing competition from their very own, franchisees indulge in 
shirking, in turn eliciting franchisor terminations in ever greater numbers as they run 
afoul of the franchise agreement. These franchisor terminations, in turn, may 
subsequently affect the financial position of franchise systems in terms of sales and 
profitability. It is therefore worth investigating the relational and financial consequences 
of franchise system growth. Importantly, it is useful to uncover means of growing even 
while reducing the extent to which terminations might even be necessary.  
 
Further, as a franchise system’s growth in a particular market fosters geographic 
proximity or clustering of the same-brand outlets leading to intrabrand competition, it is 
useful to uncover the conditions under which this proximity is beneficial or harmful to 
the same-brand outlets’ performance. Proximal same-brand outlets may share knowledge 
while competing with one another. The boundary conditions where one effect overcomes 
the other are worth exploring. 
 
My dissertation comprises two essays assessing the performance implications of growth 
and geography in the context of franchising at two different levels of analysis – at the 
franchise system-, and at the individual outlet-level. My first essay traces the growth in 
the retail footprint – the number of outlets operating – of 75 franchise systems operating 
in 11 industries, observed over up to thirteen years. In contrast, essay 2 examines the 
implications of growth-induced proximity for each of the 988 individual outlets of a 
single franchise system from its inception in 1977 until 2012. Overall, my findings 
suggest that franchise system growth increases franchisor terminations of franchisees, but 
the likelihood of these terminations may be reduced if growth relies on ownership of 
franchisor outlets, higher royalty rate, or clustering of outlets. Furthermore, the impact of 
ii 
 
clustering of outlets on their performance is contingent on outlets’ experience and the 
governance context. 
 
Keywords: Franchising, Growth, Governance, Geography, Performance. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1) Franchising: Definition and Importance to the Economy  
Franchising is a commonly used form of business, especially in the retail and service 
sectors (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Combs and Ketchen 2003). Franchise businesses make 
a significant contribution to the economy. In the US, a new franchise business opens 
every eight minutes, and 900,000 franchise outlets in the US generate over two trillion 
dollars in economic output and about 50 per cent of retail sales (International Franchise 
Association 2016). After the US, Canada is home to the second largest franchise business 
market in the world, with over 78,000 franchise units. The Canadian franchise industry 
generates approximately $68 billion in revenue every year (Canadian Franchise 
Association 2016).  
 
A franchise arrangement involves the owner of a product or service (the franchisor) 
selling the right to use its brand name, product specifications, and business model to 
another party (the franchisee) in a specific location and time period, typically in exchange 
for an upfront fee plus ongoing royalties as a percentage of sales (Combs, Michael, and 
Castrogiovanni 2004). 
 
Two different types of franchising relationships exist – product distribution franchising 
and business format franchising (International Franchise Association 2016). 
 
Product Distribution/Trademark Franchising. In a product distribution franchise 
relationship, also known as trademark or traditional franchising, the franchisor makes 
available a product to the franchisee (Alon 2001; Lafontaine 1992). Typically, the 
product is sold with a mark-up to the franchisee, who then goes on to sell it at a further 
2 
 
profit. Examples of product distribution franchising can be found in the beverage, retail, 
gasoline, and automotive sectors. 
 
Business Format Franchising. In marked contrast to trademark franchising, in a business 
format franchise relationship, the franchisor provides to the franchisee not just its brand 
name, products, and services, but an entire system for operating the business. The 
franchisee generally receives support from the franchisor in the form of site selection and 
development, operating manuals, training, quality control, and a marketing strategy (Sen 
1998; Sorenson and Sorenson 2001). In return, the franchisee agrees to comply with all 
the stipulated contractual obligations, and to pay the franchisor an initial one-time 
payment and an ongoing stream of royalties, typically expressed as a percentage of gross 
sales. Business format franchising is widespread and especially popular in industries like 
fast food and full-service restaurants, hotels, and personal and business services (Combs 
and Ketchen 2003; Srinivasan 2006). 
 
A franchise agreement is a partnership between the two parties, whereby the franchisor’s 
brand name and operational know-how are wedded to the franchisee’s effort, compliance, 
and capital. As such, franchising is considered a very effective vehicle for growth. Yet 
growth, in turn, poses challenges for the franchisor and its franchisees alike. The 
franchisor is challenged to ensure that system uniformity is maintained (Bradach 1997). 
Franchisees are constantly exposed to the risk of competing “with their own” as new 
same-brand outlets open in their vicinity (Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012). Together, 
these considerations underscore the importance not only of growth, but also of 
appropriate mechanisms deployed by the franchisor to ensure system uniformity 
(governance), and of the specific location/proximity of outlets (geography) − what I refer 
to as growth, governance, and geography.  
 
My dissertation seeks to assess the performance implications of growth, governance, and 
geography in the context of business format franchising. My choice of the business 
format franchising context is guided by at least three considerations. First, relative to 
product distribution/trademark franchising, business format franchising demands more 
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coordination and communication between franchisor and franchisees. Second, and 
primarily because of the shared brand, the performance implications of not following 
guidelines spill over beyond the focal outlet to others sharing the same brand. Third, 
business format franchising is the more common and increasingly popular type of 
franchising (International Franchise Association 2016). The next section includes a 
discussion of each of the three aspects of growth, governance, and geography in the 
context of business format franchising.    
 
1.2) Growth  
 
A significant body of prior research has equated firm growth with success (Shane 1996; 
Slater 1980). Such growth, whether reflected in increased sales (Sorenson and Sorensen 
2001), number of employees (Evans 1987), or number of outlets (Shane 1996; Shane, 
Shankar, and Aravindakshan 2006), is thought to confer economies of scale (Geroski 
1995; Shane 1996), and increase the likelihood of firm survival (Shane 1996). Within the 
context of franchising, growth is primarily thought of with respect to market coverage – 
the number of outlets in total, whether franchisor- or franchisee-owned. Such growth has 
always attracted interest and adulation; consider, for example, the statement, “If you're 
one of those who likes things to move fast, who wants a new challenge all of the time, 
then maybe a fast-growing franchise is for you” (Entrepreneur 2017). 
 
The imperative for growth is even more pronounced for franchise systems due to their 
incentive structure (Martin 1988). Franchisors’ dependence on gross revenue-based 
royalties and the need to attract strong franchisee partners create a compelling incentive 
to grow the franchise system by expanding the number of outlets (Kaufmann and Rangan 
1990). Yet, it is also well known that franchise systems struggle to achieve a delicate 
balance when managing growth in their retail footprint. Too slow, and they risk stagnant 
sales and sub-optimal scale; too fast, and they face the devastating losses that accompany 
an unrestrained increase in footprint.  
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Franchise system growth poses communication and coordination challenges for 
franchisors and strains their financial and managerial resources (Eisenhardt 1988; 
Penrose 1959; Shane 1996). The more far-flung the outlets, the greater the cost of 
coordinating them, and the lesser the franchisor’s ability to ensure compliance with 
established operating procedures (Brickley and Dark 1987). These growth-related 
communication and coordination difficulties as well as resource constraints make the 
monitoring difficult which, in turn, enhances the shirking propensity of franchisees1. 
Greater shirking leads to greater instances of non-compliance (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 
1992), which likely result in a greater need for franchisor terminations2 to weed out non-
performing franchisees and to keep the system efficient and profitable.  
 
Prior literature has made significant contributions to understanding franchise system 
growth and its drivers. Work by Brickley and Dark 1987, Lafontaine 1992, Norton 1988, 
and Shane 1996 provides support for the role of franchising in mitigating the agency 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, in turn helping achieve faster growth. 
Jindal 2011 and Kaufman and Dant 1996 also examine how franchise systems might 
grow; their work emphasizes the role of multi-unit franchising – an arrangement under 
which franchisees are allowed to own and operate multiple units – in reducing the 
franchisor burden of communication and coordination with its individual franchisees. 
Norton 1988 suggests that physically dispersed outlets are best franchised rather than 
company-owned. Most recently, Shane, Shankar, and Arvindakshan 2006 find that fast 
growing franchise systems fuel their growth by offering lower royalty rates and initial 
franchise fees, relying on self-owned outlets less, and lowering the initial investment 
required of their franchisees via financing assistance. Kosova and Lafontaine 2010 
uncover a “ceiling effect”, as older and larger franchise systems tend to exhibit lower 
system growth.  
                                                          
1 I acknowledge that franchisors are also prone to shirking with respect to their obligations, resulting in a 
situation known as double moral hazard (Lafontaine 1992); Klein (1980) suggests that concern for their 
brand reputation serves as a bond against franchisor shirking. 
2 Hereinafter, my use of the term “franchisor terminations” refers to franchisors’ termination of their 
franchisees. 
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Despite these important contributions, prior research falls short of providing a definitive 
answer regarding the consequences of growth. In particular, three shortcomings are worth 
noting. First, the overwhelming focus of extant research has been on identifying the 
drivers of outlet growth, emphasizing growth as an end in itself (Eisenhardt 1988; 
Kalnins 2004; Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012; Penrose 1959). This focus on growth 
presumes growth to be a positive outcome. Several real-life business cases (e.g., 
Subway’s rapid growth and its declining same-store sales in the US, Wall Street Journal, 
August 15, 2015) contradict this assumption and demonstrate that greater growth is not 
synonymous with higher performance.  
 
A second major limitation of extant research on growth pertains to its emphasis on year-
over-year (YOY) growth differentials. The benefit of such an approach is the relative 
ease with which growth (i.e., increases or decreases relative to the prior year) may be 
inferred. The prime disadvantage of such a static view, however, lies in its single point in 
time focus (Palmatier Houston, Dant, and Grewal 2013), resulting in “…an incomplete 
picture of the signaling phenomenon in the marketplace” (DeKinder and Kohli 2008, 
p.84). Potential franchisees are more interested in the value of the growth trend of a 
franchise system over an extended period of time. This growth trend or flow signal as 
DeKinder and Kohli 2008 refer to it discounts the fluctuations attendant to YOY growth 
considerations. The absence of such an analysis from the extant growth literature 
represents a significant obstacle to gaining a better understanding of growth-related 
performance effects.  
 
A third gap in our understanding of growth-attributable performance outcomes lies in the 
inadequate attention paid to how such growth occurs. An increasing retail footprint 
results in a “spread” of the markets covered, and a corresponding increase in the costs of 
communicating with and coordinating far flung outlets (Brickley and Dark 1987). At 
least three mechanisms have been identified as potential solutions to this coordination 
problem: establishing franchisor-owned outlets (i.e., ownership-based governance) 
(Brickley and Dark 1987), increasing franchisor incentives to maintain quality (i.e., 
royalty rate) (Lal 1990), and clustering outlets (i.e., geographic proximity) (Lu and 
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Wedig 2013). Notwithstanding recent theoretical developments (Bell, Tracey, and Heide 
2009; Tracey, Heide, and Bell 2014) that point to an intriguing interplay between the 
geographic proximity inherent to clustering of outlets and the governance thereof, an 
empirical assessment of the interplay of growth, governance, and geography as yet 
awaits.                     
 
1.3) Governance  
 
Palay (1984), p.265 defines governance as “…the institutional framework in which 
contracts are initiated, negotiated, monitored, adapted, and terminated.” Within the 
context of business format franchising, ownership of the outlet represents a 
significant governance mechanism (Srinivasan 2006). Two aspects of ownership, in 
particular, are worth noting, 1) ownership-based governance, and 2) shared 
ownership.  
 
Ownership-based governance reflects the extent to which the franchisor owns and 
operates some outlets even while franchising others (Heide 2003; Srinivasan 2006). 
The presence of franchisor-owned outlets along with franchisee-owned outlets 
ensures greater control of franchisor over operations, products, and profits (Heide 
1994). This vertical integration enhances the credibility of the franchisor's contract 
termination safeguard, curtails franchisees’ opportunism, and reduces the franchisor's 
vulnerability (Dutta, Bergen, Heide, and John 1995). Over the last three decades, a 
significant body of work in economics, marketing, and management has identified the 
drivers (e.g., Dutta et al.1995; Heide 1994, 2003) of ownership-based governance and 
its consequences (e.g., Michael 2000; Srinivasan 2006) alike. One of the highly cited 
advantages of ownership-based governance is the synergy it brings (Lafontaine and 
Kaufmann 1994; Martin 1988). Franchisors gain and leverage their experience in 
their self-owned outlets, over which they have control. Subsequently, they model 
responses in franchisee-owned outlets, over which they have much less control.  
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Furthermore, Bradach (1997) finds evidence of a two-way, mutual-learning process 
between franchisor and franchisee-owned outlets, which he calls the "ratcheting 
process”, whereby both sides influence each other, raising the level of uniformity and 
the performance of the franchise system as a whole (Srinivasan 2006). 
 
At the individual outlet-level, it is also important to understand the impact of shared 
ownership of the focal and proximal outlets (e.g., multi-unit franchisees). Shared 
ownership positively affects the knowledge transfer process by enhancing the motivation 
of outlets to seek and share knowledge with one another (Argote and Darr 2000; Darr and 
Kurtzberg 2000). Relatedly, proximal outlets that share ownership are likely to transfer 
knowledge through contact learning via the transmission of routines through personal 
and formal relationships, rather than requiring the focal outlet to rely on mimetic learning 
via observation or vicarious learning of routines from its proximal outlets (Baum and 
Ingram 1998; Miner and Haunschild 1995). As well, and perhaps as important, shared 
ownership of the clustered outlets weakens the competition intensity between the focal 
and proximal outlets (Kalnins and Lafontaine 2004).  
 
Governance has a very important role to play in franchising, but at least two 
limitations remain. First, prior research has mostly studied the ownership context at 
the system-level (e.g., across all 50 US states) (Heide 2003; Srinivasan 2006). A 
firm’s relative reliance on franchisor-owned outlets over time may vary significantly 
across the different markets the firm competes in. This is evident in Figure 1, which 
displays the ownership-based governance strategy of KFC at the system-level (Panel 
A) as well as in each of two US states (regional markets; Panels B, C). The 
overwhelming focus of prior work on system-level ownership-based governance 
hides the individual market-level dynamics and their performance consequences.  
 
Second, extant literature provides little insight as to how performance outcomes may 
vary by ownership form. For a variety of reasons, franchisees are likely to be more 
vulnerable to intrabrand competition relative to franchisor-owned outlets and to 
benefit less from the knowledge transfer opportunity. Franchisors receive royalties as 
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a percentage of franchisees’ sales and not of their profits (Lafontaine 1992). They are 
therefore incentivized to open new franchisee-owned outlets in close proximity to 
existing outlets as long as the total sales revenue across the existing and newly 
established outlets increases (Kalnins 2004). Further, franchisee-owned outlets are 
likely to gain less from knowledge transfer from proximal same-brand outlets due to 
franchisors’ reliance on iron-clad contractual agreements (Kashyap, Antia, and 
Frazier 2012) that reduce the leeway available to franchisees to make significant 
changes in response to the additional knowhow they are able to glean from their 
proximal same-brand outlets. Overall, performance of franchisee-owned and 
franchisor-owned outlets is likely to vary, and this variation may have a significant 
impact on the franchise system performance in the presence of clustering and growth. 
As yet, however, there has been no rigorous assessment of how individual outlet 
performance may vary by governance – ownership-based governance or shared 
ownership – in presence of growth and clustering.  
 
1.4) Geography 
 
Geographic proximity3 – the physical nearness of outlets – has a strong connection 
with franchise system growth. The primary obstacle to firm growth is the inability of 
firms’ systems and routines to keep up with the ever-increasing demands imposed by 
rapid growth (Jargon 2015; Penrose 1959). Franchisors pursuing a growth strategy 
must ensure that each of its franchisees follow operating procedures completely, so as 
to ensure uniformity of the product offering across all markets served (Bradach 
1997). The more far-flung the outlets, the greater the cost of monitoring them 
(Brickley and Dark 1987), and the lesser the franchisors’ ability to ensure compliance 
with established operating procedures. The proximity of same-brand outlets provides 
a monitoring efficiency to franchisors as well as provides an opportunity for 
knowledge transfer between outlets (Lu and Wedig 2013). The extent of the 
proximity of outlets therefore may have important performance implications for the 
                                                          
3 In this research, I measure proximity in terms of distance. To account for regional variances, I include 
market-specific control variables, such as population, area, income in my empirical specification. 
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franchise system. However, prior research on the consequences of proximity has 
yielded conflicting results.  
 
On the one hand, proximity is known to induce richer, more frequent interactions 
(Ganesan, Malter, and Rindfleisch 2005), thereby facilitating the learning and the transfer 
of relevant operating knowledge among same-brand outlets (Kalnins and Mayer 2004). 
Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011, p.1124) define organizational learning as “…a change 
in the organization’s knowledge that occurs as a function of experience.” Such 
knowledge includes but is not limited to technical skills, product- and service process-, 
and local market-specific knowledge (Ho and Ganesan 2013; Kalnins and Mayer 2004). 
Knowledge acquisition might occur directly via the firm’s own operating experience (i.e., 
knowledge creation) and/or indirectly by knowledge transfer from other firms’ 
experience, and is continuous. Whether newly established or mature, outlets of the 
franchise system gain from learning from each other about their operating environment, 
acquiring product- and process-related knowhow, and sharing relevant and useful 
operating procedures and practices (Bradach 1997; Shane 2005). Due to this greater 
interaction, learning, and knowledge transfer, deviations from standard operating 
procedure become known more easily and peer pressure serves to reduce its incidence 
(Lafontaine and Slade 2007).  
 
On the other hand, the prospect of intrabrand competition due to proximity 
simultaneously poses a daunting and real threat (Kalnins 2004; Pancras, Sriram, and 
Kumar 2012). Specifically, proximally located same-brand outlets are competitors 
with similar traits and are greater threats to one other (Baum and Mezias 1992). 
Greater physical distance between same-brand outlets is therefore recommended to 
avoid sales cannibalization (Kalnins 2004; Pancras, Sriram and Kumar 2012). Extant 
literature on proximity-related consequences is thus divided, with some scholars 
focusing on the positive performance effects of proximity, and others warning of its 
ill effects.  
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Although useful to the aim of grounding the assessment in a relevant and rigorous 
theoretical context, the exclusive reliance on one or the other theoretical perspective does 
not allow for the possibility that both positive and negative effects might obtain. As well, 
prior research has focused for the most part on the physical proximity (i.e., the 
geographic distance to the nearest neighbor or to others within the cluster) of same-brand 
outlets. The emphasis on physical nearness assumes geographic distance to be the sole 
determinant of outlet performance and ignores important factors that may significantly 
temper this relationship at the individual outlet- and the system-level, in particular, 
knowledge transfer.  
 
This dissertation comprises two essays. A brief overview of each essay and the research 
question it answers, follows.  
 
1.5) Essay 1: Overview and Research Question  
 
Franchising has always relied on a strident growth narrative, yet evidence regarding the 
consequences of franchise system growth remains elusive. Whereas high system growth 
is lauded and actively sought, unfettered expansion may severely strain franchisors’ 
ability to maintain system standards and reduce franchisee motivation to remain in 
compliance with their contractual obligations, likely resulting in higher terminations by 
franchisors. The present study assesses the relational (franchisor terminations) and 
financial (system sales and profits) consequences of franchise system growth. Our 
analysis of nearly 25,000 observations on 75 franchise systems across all 50 US states 
over up to 12 years relates growth in terms of a smoothed (up to 5-year) moving average 
of change in the number of outlets to franchisors' terminations of their franchisees. We 
synthesize insights from agency theory with research on governance (ownership and 
royalty rate) and clustering-based perspectives to assess the moderating role played by 
ownership-based governance, royalty rate, and clustering in the growth-franchisor 
terminations relationship. The sales- and profitability-related financial consequences of 
terminations are also assessed. Overall, essay 1 seeks to address the following question: 
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Research Question 1: How does franchise system growth impact franchisor terminations  
                                    and consequently, its financial performance? 
 
1.6) Essay 2: Overview and Research Question 
 
As franchise systems expand, the clustering and resulting proximity of same-brand 
outlets often become a contentious issue. The increased interactions among outlets may 
facilitate knowledge transfer, even while inducing intra-brand competition. Prior research 
has considered each possibility − knowledge transfer or intra-brand competition − in 
isolation, resulting in conflicting recommendations to the central question: should 
multiple same-brand outlets be clustered with or distant from one another? The present 
study takes the perspective of the focal outlet, and emphasizes that the opportunity to 
share knowledge afforded by clustering-based proximity may or may not be realized, 
depending on the motivation and ability of the clustered outlets to transfer and absorb 
knowledge, and on the governance context. Our analysis of more than 8,000 observations 
on the 988 outlets of a US-based automotive service franchise system from 1977 to 2012, 
and corresponding outlet-level sales information from 2004 to 2012 provides support for 
our conceptual framework. In sum, essay 2 addresses the following question: 
 
Research Question 2: How does a franchise system’s evolving growth pattern   
                                   (clustering) impact the individual outlets’ performance? 
 
1.7) Insights and Anticipated Contributions 
 
This research makes at least three contributions to what is known about franchise system 
growth, governance, and geography. First, I synthesize the well-established theoretical 
perspectives of agency theory, clustering theory, intrabrand competition, and governance 
to provide a better understanding of franchise system growth and its performance 
consequences. Instead of using the year-over-year perspective of growth, this research 
provides a holistic view of growth by adopting a growth trend perspective that provides a 
growth pattern over multiple years, which is less prone to fluctuations. 
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Second, I assess the likely moderating impact of governance on franchise system growth 
and geographic decisions. Franchisors may rely on their own outlets and franchise others 
in a certain proportion. With the passage of time, franchisors may decide to persist with 
this proportion or change it by relying on self- and franchisee-owned outlets in current 
and new geographic markets. Thus, governance form may have some important 
implications for franchise system performance. This study attempts to assess the 
moderating impact of governance form in this growth, geography, and performance 
relationship. Specifically, my research assesses the moderating effect of ownership-based 
governance at the individual market-level on franchise system growth-performance 
relationship (Essay 1). I hypothesize that a greater proportion of franchisor-owned outlets 
at the individual market-level decreases the likelihood of franchisor terminations of 
franchisees. As well, my research investigates the tempering effect of governance context 
on the clustering-performance relationship at the individual outlet-level (Essay 2). I 
expect that shared ownership of same-brand outlets (e.g., multi-unit franchisees) 
enhances the motivation of clustered outlets to transfer knowledge and dampens the intra-
brand competitive effects. Further, I hypothesize that franchisee-owned outlets perform 
less well when clustered relative to franchisor-owned outlets as they likely face greater 
intra-brand competition and gain less from knowledge transfer. 
 
Finally, this research investigates the performance implications of clustering at the 
individual outlet-level. I extend the notion of clustering past its exclusive focus on how 
geographically close the outlets within a cluster are to the specific identities of the focal 
outlet and those proximal to it, and demonstrate that the impact of clustering on 
performance is contingent on outlets’ experience and the governance context.  
 
In what follows, I present essay 1 (Franchise System Growth and Franchisors’ 
Relationship Termination Behavior) and essay 2 (Clustering, Governance, and Individual 
Outlet Sales: A Multi-Year Analysis of an Evolving Franchise System) in the form of 
chapter 2 and chapter 3 respectively. In each essay, I first develop the theoretical 
underpinnings via a proposed conceptual framework, and then discuss the individual 
hypotheses linking explanatory variables of interest to performance outcomes. This is 
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followed by a description of the research method, results, and their implications. Chapter 
4 concludes my dissertation with a discussion of the points of commonality and 
differentiation of my essays, the implications arising from both essays taken as a whole, 
the limitations of my endeavors, and possible future research directions. 
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FIGURE 1 
OWNERSHIP-BASED GOVERNANCE OF KFC  
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Chapter 2 
 
Franchise System Growth and Franchisors’ Relationship 
Termination Behavior 
(Resubmitted to Journal of Marketing Research) 
 
Over the last decade, the well-known quick service restaurant chain Subway has 
aggressively expanded its retail footprint – the total number of outlets operated – opening 
up to 1,200 outlets per year. This strident growth has not come without any problems, 
though. In August 2015, Subway experienced its first year of declining sales in over a 
decade. “Franchisees are frustrated…and perceptions of Subway’s food 
quality…[are]…slipping” (Jargon 2015) as they shirk on their performance obligations in 
response to the perceived threat of intra-brand competition induced by the ramp-up in 
footprint. In a bid to maintain system standards, Subway has stepped up its terminations 
(Shane 1998) of non-compliant franchisees. Franchisors’ dependence on gross revenue-
based royalties and the need to attract strong franchisee partners create compelling 
incentives to grow the franchise system (Kaufmann and Rangan 1990); 4 their expansion 
efforts, however, are greeted with suspicion and frequently with outright hostility by their 
existing franchisees. The question that naturally arises is: What are the relational and 
financial consequences of franchise system growth?  
 
Although efforts to better understand franchise system growth have been plentiful and 
long standing (Fan, Kühn, and Lafontaine 2013; Kaufman and Dant 1996; Norton 1988; 
Shane 1996; Shane, Shankar, and Arvindakshan 2006), our examination of prior research 
fails to provide a definitive answer on the issue of growth-attributable performance for at 
least three reasons. First, the overwhelming focus of extant research has been on 
identifying the drivers of outlet growth (see Kaufman and Rangan 1990 and Srinivasan, 
Sridhar, Narayanan, and Sihi 2013 for notable exceptions), emphasizing growth as an end 
                                                          
4 We use the terms “franchise system” and “system” interchangeably to refer to the total number of outlets, 
whether franchisee- or franchisor-owned, across all markets (in the present context, US states) the franchise 
brand operates in. 
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in itself. Such a single-minded focus on growth for growth’s sake ignores the deleterious 
effects of the intra-brand competition that might attend such growth (Pancras, Sriram, and 
Kumar 2012), and that firms may be hard-pressed to manage the increasing growth-
attendant complexities (Penrose 1959). Subway’s ongoing troubles with its franchisees 
represent but one recent example of growth-attributable pains. 
 
A second limitation of extant research on growth pertains to its emphasis on year-over-
year (YOY) growth differentials. The benefit of such an approach is the relative ease with 
which growth (i.e., increases or decreases relative to a base) may be inferred. Its prime 
disadvantage, however, lies in what DeKinder and Kohli (2008, p.84) refer to as the 
“…‘point signal’ – information about a firm at a single point in time…” and the resulting 
“…incomplete picture…” it provides (ibid.). Interested observers, whether they be 
potential or current franchisees or investors, are more apt to value the “flow signals” 
(ibid.) inherent in the long-term trend characterizing growth, and to discount the 
fluctuations attendant to YOY growth considerations. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, 
there has been no attempt made to rigorously discern the long term trends with respect to 
growth. The absence of such an effort represents a significant obstacle to gaining a more 
complete understanding of growth-related performance effects.  
 
A third gap in our understanding of growth-attributable performance outcomes lies in the 
inadequate attention paid to how such growth occurs. By definition, an increasing retail 
footprint results in a “spread” of the markets covered, and a corresponding increase in the 
costs of communicating and coordinating far flung outlets (Brickley and Dark 1987). At 
least three mechanisms have been identified as potential solutions to this coordination 
problem: establishing franchisor-owned outlets (i.e., ownership-based governance) 
(Brickley and Dark 1987), increasing franchisor incentives to maintain quality (i.e., 
royalty rate) (Lal 1990), and clustering outlets (Lu and Wedig 2013). Notwithstanding 
recent theoretical developments (Bell, Tracey, and Heide 2009; Tracey, Heide, and Bell 
2014) that point to an intriguing interplay between the geographic proximity inherent to 
clustering of outlets and the governance thereof, an empirical assessment of the interplay 
of growth, governance, and geography as yet awaits.           
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The present study, undertaken in the context of US business format franchising, 
represents an attempt to address each of the preceding limitations. Specifically, we posit 
the extent and nature of franchise systems’ growth to cause variations in (a) franchisees’ 
incentives to comply with performance obligations, and (b) franchisors’ ability and 
motivation to take action against non-compliant franchisees (i.e., terminate agreements 
with existing franchisees) – what we refer to as franchisor terminations. We rely on a 
unique dataset of more than 25,000 observations on 75 franchise systems across 50 US 
states over up to 12 years, relating growth trends in terms of change in the number of 
outlets to observed franchisors’ terminations of franchisees (i.e., relational consequences) 
and their sales and profitability-related implications (i.e., financial consequences).  
 
In doing so, we make three key contributions to our understanding of franchise system 
growth and its consequences. First, we synthesize agency theory with research on 
governance (ownership and royalty rate) and clustering of outlets to provide a more 
complete understanding of the termination-related consequences of franchise system 
growth (Antia and Frazier 2001). To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first attempt to 
relate franchise system growth to variations in franchisors’ terminations of franchisees 
and their corresponding system-wide financial consequences. 
 
Second, we build upon and extend the year-over-year perspective adopted by prior 
growth-related inquiries to the growth trend displayed by each franchise system over a 
multi-year observation window. By describing franchise system growth in terms of a 
smoothed (up to 5-year) moving average of change in number of outlets, we 
accommodate a wide array of variations in franchise systems’ developing retail footprints 
over time even while providing a holistic view of growth (see, for example, related work 
by DeKinder and Kohli 2008, and Palmatier, Houston, Dant, and Grewal 2013). We then 
investigate the impact of these growth trends on franchisor terminations. 
 
Third, our theoretical framework and empirical analysis focus not only on how much but 
also how franchise systems grow, and their performance outcomes. We take as our 
starting point the classic growth-limiting problems of communication and coordination 
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challenges (Brickley and Dark 1987) and resource constraints (Penrose 1955; 1959), 
which likely enhance franchisees’ propensity to shirk. Franchisor terminations are 
therefore likely to go up due to greater instances of non-compliance. We build on prior 
theoretical and empirical work emphasizing the role played by ownership-based 
governance, royalty rate, and clustering of outlets in affecting the growth-terminations 
relationship.  
 
In the section that follows, we first develop the theoretical underpinnings of our 
integrative conceptual framework and elicit the individual hypotheses linking franchise 
system growth to franchisor terminations. This is followed by a description of the 
research method, results, and their implications. We conclude with the limitations of our 
study and possible future research directions.  
 
Background 
 
The success of the franchise business model rests on agents’ (franchisees’) 
compliance with the contractual terms offered by the principal (franchisor) (Antia and 
Frazier 2001), which is in turn dependent on the self-enforcing nature of these terms 
(Klein 1996; Lafontaine and Slade 2007; Telser 1960). Figure 1 represents our 
conceptual framework. Specifically, franchise agreements are said to be self-
enforcing when franchisees are incentivized to comply with their performance 
obligations via a combination of a positive stream of rents accruing from their efforts 
(Bercovitz 2003) and the credible threat of being cut off from this stream of rents 
(i.e., terminated by the franchisor) if found to be shirking or otherwise non-compliant 
with the agreed to terms. Any franchisee-perceived reduction in the anticipated 
stream of rents and/or in the credible threat of franchisors’ termination of errant 
franchisees is likely to elicit franchisee shirking, in turn eroding the self-enforcing 
nature of the franchise agreement (Klein 1995) and increasing franchisors’ 
enforcement efforts (i.e., greater terminations). 
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We relate franchise system growth in each market – the increase in that market in the 
number of outlets operating under the franchised brand – to the system-wide (i.e., 
across markets) incidence of termination by franchisors of their franchisees. In the 
section that follows, we elicit the likely impact of franchise system growth on both 
the franchisees’ anticipated stream of rents as well as their perceptions of the credible 
threat of franchisor termination. We first hypothesize the likely impact of the extent 
of growth in the number of outlets on the self-enforcing nature of the franchise 
agreement; this is followed by a discussion of how the nature of such growth – 
specifically, franchisors’ reliance on ownership-based governance, royalty rate, and 
clustering – might “shift” (Shane 1996) franchisee perceptions of the anticipated 
stream of rents and/or the credible threat of franchisor termination, in turn varying the 
franchisee incentive to indulge in shirking and the observed franchisor terminations.  
 
Two points are worth noting in our proposed framework. First, although the 
franchisor’s termination of an individual franchisee and the consequent dissolution of 
the particular relationship is an off-equilibrium occurrence (i.e., the particular dyadic 
relationship has deviated from “steady state” conditions), the system-wide incidence 
of franchisors terminating franchisees is not at all atypical (Antia and Frazier 2001). 
A well-functioning franchise system requires the jettisoning of non-compliant 
franchisees (Brickley, Dark, and Weisbach 1991), making terminations a necessary 
and not uncommon franchisor practice. It is this system-wide extent of franchisor 
terminations upon which our interest focuses. 
 
Second, and similar to the well-known notion of power being inferred from not 
needing to exercise it (Frazier and Summers 1984; Gaski 1984), self-enforcing 
agreements minimize the need for franchisor terminations as franchisees are 
incentivized by the stream of rents and the credible threat of their cessation to comply 
with their performance obligations (Antia and Frazier 2001; Klein 1995; Mathewson 
and Winter 1985). We rely on this well-theorized inverse association (Gaski 1984; 
Gaski and Nevin 1985) to attribute variations in observed system-wide franchisor 
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terminations to franchise system growth, and assess its implications for the extent to 
which the franchise agreement is self-enforcing.   
 
Hypotheses 
 
Extent of franchise system growth and terminations. We anticipate a direct positive 
association between growth in the number of outlets and franchisor terminations. We 
attribute this to the combination of a decrease in franchisees’ anticipated stream of 
rents as well as in franchisors’ monitoring and enforcement capabilities, each the 
attendant outcome of greater growth. As the number of outlets in a market increases, 
the prospect of intra-brand competition increases (Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012). 
The addition of each new outlet increases the probability of a franchisee competing 
for sales with one or more same-branded outlets (Jargon 2015), and the resulting 
dilution of franchisees’ stream of rents (Kalnins 2004).  
 
As well, rapid growth in a market places undue stress on the franchisor’s monitoring 
and enforcement capabilities (Shane 1996). In particular, the communication and 
coordination challenges for franchisors increase significantly in the wake of rapid 
growth and strains their financial and managerial resources (Eisenhardt 1988; Penrose 
1959; Shane 1996). The result is a significant erosion of the franchisor’s credible 
threat of termination, as the franchisor’s ability to monitor its franchisees and respond 
to their shirking with appropriate corrective action is compromised.  
 
Together, the decrease in anticipated rents and in the franchisor ability to monitor its 
fast growing number of franchisees pose a double jeopardy. Faced with the daunting 
prospect of intra-brand competition and a simultaneous reduced likelihood of 
franchisor monitoring, franchisees are likely to shirk on their quality inputs (Bergen, 
Dutta, and Walker 1992) and free ride (Rubin 1990). The egregious and more 
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frequent violations lead to a higher likely incidence of franchisor terminations (Antia 
and Frazier 2001).5 We therefore expect that: 
 
H1: The greater the growth of the franchise system, the greater the number of 
franchisor terminations. 
 
Shifting the Self-Enforcement Calculus 
 
Thus far, our focus has been on the direct effect of the extent (i.e., the magnitude) of 
franchise system growth on franchisor terminations, ceteris paribus. We now shift 
our attention from how much to how such growth might occur. Specifically, we assess 
how each of three commonly deployed franchisor mechanisms – ownership based 
governance, the royalty rate, and clustering – might serve to “shift” franchisees’ self-
enforcement calculus.  
 
Ownership-based governance. Ownership-based governance reflects the extent to 
which the franchisor owns and operates outlets in the franchise system. Over the last 
three decades, a significant body of work in economics, marketing, and management 
has identified the drivers (e.g., Dutta, Bergen, Heide, and John 1995; Heide 1994, 
2003) of ownership-based governance and its consequences (e.g., Michael 2000; 
Srinivasan 2006) alike.  
 
Ownership of outlets provides crucial local market information to franchisors and 
helps them set relevant performance benchmarks for franchisees (Bradach 1997; 
Dutta et al. 1995). No longer can franchisees lay the blame for inadequate 
performance on localized market inequities, as franchisor-owned outlets would be 
subject to the same factors. As a result, franchisors are better able to detect shirking 
and non-compliance of franchisees (Shane 1998). As well, self-owned outlets provide 
                                                          
5 One might surmise that lower levels of monitoring and the resulting decrease in the likelihood of the 
franchisor detecting franchisee non-compliance should lead to a lower number of franchisor terminations 
(Antia et al. 2006). Franchisees emboldened to shirk by lower levels of franchisor monitoring, however, 
tend to shirk more (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992), leading in turn to increased complaints by other 
franchisees and/or customers. The net result is an increase in the number of franchisor terminations as 
franchisors respond to these complaints.  
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a local market presence to the franchisor resulting in frequent face-to-face 
interactions and on-site visits to franchisees (Oxenfeldt and Kelly 1969; Srinivasan 
2006), which enhances franchisors’ ability to detect franchisees’ shirking and non-
compliance. 
 
Furthermore, having self-owned outlets reduces franchisors’ dependence on their 
franchisees. The franchisor may not be as bound by the constraints of maintaining 
relationships because it has less incentive to continue such relationships should 
franchisees shirk or fail to meet expectations (Lusch and Brown 1996). Moreover, the 
franchisor with relatively low dependence may not be as concerned about the 
consequences of retaliations to its actions (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995). 
This relative power advantage and lower dependence result in increased credibility of 
the franchisor’s threat of terminating noncompliant franchisees (Heide 2003).  
 
Interestingly, the establishment and operation of franchisor-owned outlets in the 
vicinity is not solely a threat. Rather, franchisor owned outlets play a significant role 
in demonstrating the efficacy of new operational procedures (Judd and Justis 2008), 
disseminating new knowhow (Argote 2011), and helping franchisees in these markets 
up their capabilities by “selling not telling” (Bradach 1997).  The resulting increase in 
the franchisees’ anticipated stream of rents is likely to persuade them to comply to a 
greater extent (Brickley and Dark 1987).  
 
Together, the increase in the stream of rents and in the credible threat of termination 
thus likely strengthen the self-enforcing nature of the franchise agreement, rendering 
the need for franchisor terminations lower. The positive association between 
franchise system growth and franchisor terminations is likely weakened as franchisors 
rely more on ownership-based governance, as both the growth-attributed dilution of 
the stream of rents and of the credible threat of termination is countered. Accordingly,  
 
H2: The greater the extent of ownership-based governance, the weaker the 
positive association between franchise system growth and franchisor 
terminations of franchisees. 
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Royalty rate. The typical business format franchise relationship calls for the 
franchisee to make ongoing payments to the franchisor and to abide by the latter’s 
operational stipulations. In return, the franchisor provides ongoing support to 
franchisees, and monitors and enforces quality standards across members of the 
franchise system on a continual basis (Lal 1990; Shane 2005). A rich body of prior 
work in economics (Gallini and Lutz 1992; Lafontaine 1992), management (Shane 
1998; Shane and Foo 1999) and marketing (Agrawal and Lal 1995; Lal 1990) 
emphasizes the role of higher royalty rates in motivating franchisors to increase their 
monitoring and enforcement efforts.  
 
To the extent that the franchisor receives ongoing royalties, she has an incentive not 
to default on her monitoring obligations (Lal 1990; Rubin 1978; Shane 1998). The 
royalty rate is directly related to the importance of brand-name investments 
(Lafontaine 1992; Lal 1990), and positively affects monitoring frequency (Agrawal 
and Lal 1995), in turn enhancing the franchisor’s credible threat of terminating non-
compliant franchisees (Lal 1990; Shane and Foo 1999). Franchisees in such well 
monitored systems are wary of running afoul of their compliance requirements 
(Kashyap, Antia, and Frazier 2012), and more prone to abide with these. In turn, the 
greater the compliance of franchisees, the lesser the need for franchisors to undertake 
corrective action, i.e., terminate noncompliant franchisees. 
 
Although a higher royalty rate may decrease franchisee motivation to expend their 
best efforts on behalf of the brand (Antia, Mani, and Wathne 2017), the increased 
monitoring elicited by such high royalty rates is effective in maintaining and 
enhancing the value of the franchise brand (Lafontaine 1992; Lal 1990). The likely 
increase in franchisees’ anticipated stream of rents is expected to evoke greater 
compliance, rendering franchisor terminations unnecessary.  
 
Similar to the effect of ownership based governance, a higher royalty rate strengthens 
the self-enforcing nature of the franchise agreement by dissuading franchisees from 
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shirking (Rubin 1990). The higher royalty rate confers greater resources on the 
franchisors (Shane 1998), who are able to allocate these greater resources to meet the 
increased coordination and communication demands attendant to rapid franchise 
system growth. Accordingly,   
 
H3: The higher the royalty rate, the weaker the positive association between 
franchise system growth and franchisor terminations of franchisees. 
 
Clustering. As franchise systems cluster their outlets, the total cost of monitoring is 
spread over a greater number of proximal outlets, thereby reducing the unit cost of 
monitoring each outlet and increasing the franchisor’s monitoring ability (Lu and 
Wedig 2013). This increased monitoring ability makes it more likely for franchisors 
to detect violations and franchisee non-compliance (Brickley and Dark 1987), thereby 
increasing the credible threat of termination.  
 
As well, clustering enables the efficient and effective sharing of operating knowhow 
among same-brand outlets (Argote and Darr 2000; Argote and Miron-Spektor 2011; 
Bradach 1997), thus boosting the anticipated stream of rents for franchisees. We 
suggest that greater clustering affords the focal outlet greater opportunities to seek 
and acquire knowledge from proximal same-brand outlets while allowing operators of 
closely located outlets to observe, meet, and share knowledge with one another with 
greater ease (Ganesan, Malter, and Rindfleisch 2005), thereby facilitating the transfer 
of relevant operating knowledge among outlets (Kalnins and Mayer 2004). 
 
Together, the increase in the anticipated stream of rents and the credible threat of 
termination are likely to dominate the increased risk of intra-brand competition 
(Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012) brought about by the clustering of same-brand 
outlets and the resulting propensity of franchisees to shirk. As in the case of 
ownership-based governance and a higher royalty rate, franchisors’ reliance on 
clustering to grow their franchise systems expands the self-enforcing range of the 
franchise agreement (Klein 1996).  We therefore expect this increased self-enforcing 
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range pursuant to clustering to weaken the positive effect of franchise system growth 
on terminations. Accordingly, 
 
 H4: The greater the clustering of outlets, the weaker the positive association 
between franchise system growth and franchisor terminations of franchisees. 
 
Method 
 
Empirical Context and Data Collection Procedure 
 
We assess growth-attributable performance in the context of US-based business format 
franchising. In the US, a new franchise business opens every eight minutes, and more 
than 900,000 franchise businesses generate over two trillion dollars in economic output 
(International Franchise Association 2015). The importance of this sector to the US 
economy is thus significant. 
 
Our data collection approach requires following franchise systems’ growth across the 
multiple US states they compete in, and assessing its impact on systemwide franchisor 
terminations of franchisees over an extended period of time. Our use of multiple sources 
of data enables us to collect rich archival information, and check the validity of each data 
source where overlapping. Relying on Bond’s Franchise Guide, we sampled randomly 
from each of the 11 most popular franchised industries to select a sample of 75 US based 
franchise systems for the years 1993 to 2004 inclusive, and obtained information on their 
franchising history, royalty rate, and a host of other relevant system-specific information 
on an annual basis. For the same sample of 75 franchisors, we also obtained the franchise 
disclosure documents (FDD) filed with states’ regulatory authorities for the years 1997, 
2000, 2003, and 2004. Each FDD provides information on the current as well as the 
preceding two years of the franchisor’s operations. Some FDDs also reported more than 
the prior two years of information, thus resulting in an unbalanced dataset of 75 franchise 
firms observed over 6 to 12 years from 1993 to 2004.  
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Perhaps most important, the FDD provides information on each franchise system’s 
presence across each of the 50 US states. We manually transcribed the number of 
franchisor- and franchisee-owned outlets for each franchise system in each state and each 
year, and are thus able to obtain up to nearly 600 observations per franchise system (i.e., 
50 states x 12 years). The variation in market coverage across the franchise systems 
resulted in 25,600 observations in our sample. Table 1 displays the variables used in this 
study and their data sources. 
 
Unit of Analysis and Measures 
 
Our unit of analysis is the individual franchise system i (i = 1,….,75) observed in US 
state j (j = 1,….,50) in year t (t= 1993,.…., 2004). Our objective is to relate franchise 
system growth, ownership-based governance, royalty rate, and clustering to franchisors’ 
terminations of franchisees. We measure franchisor terminations of franchisees as the 
sum of the number of franchisees terminated and not renewed by franchisor i at time t 
(FTit). 
 
For each franchise system i, we measure franchise system growth (GRijt) as a smoothed 
multi-year (up to 5-year) moving average of change in number of outlets in US state j in 
year t. This allows us to elicit a growth trend instead of a year-over-year (YOY) growth 
data point which provides information about a firm at a single point in time and is thus 
more prone to fluctuations (DeKinder and Kohli 2008). Consistent with prior research 
(Lafontaine and Shaw 2005; Srinivasan 2006), we measure ownership-based governance 
(OGijt) as the extent to which the franchise system relies on franchisor-owned and 
operated outlets, i.e., as the ratio of franchisor-owned outlets to the total number of 
outlets for franchise system i in US state j in year t. We measure the royalty rate (RRit) as 
the ongoing payment as a percentage of sales that franchisees must pay the franchisor for 
their use of the trademark and other support (Agrawal and Lal 1995), and clustering 
(CLit) as the concentration of outlets of franchise system i in year t across 50 US states 
using the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI). Prior research has extensively used the 
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HHI as a concentration metric (e.g., Feng, Morgan, and Rego 2015; Krasnikov, Mishra, 
and Orozco 2009). 
 
Finally, we include several control variables expected to have an impact on franchisors’ 
terminations of franchisees. We include franchise system age (FAit) – the number of years 
elapsed since year of establishment of a franchise system, franchise system size (FSit) – 
the number of franchised outlets operated, and initial franchise fee (IFit) − the one-time 
fee paid by the franchisee. Further, we include market-specific control variables: market 
population (PPjt), per capita income (INCjt), total per capita taxes (TXjt), market GDP 
(GDPjt), and market area (ARj). Acknowledging the likely variation in monitoring ability 
as a function of distance (Brickley and Dark 1987), we also include distance from 
headquarters (DHij), measured using ArcGIS 10.3 as the geodesic distance of the outlets 
of franchise system i in focal state j from the capital of the US state where franchise 
system i is headquartered. Additionally, we control for each of the 11 industries 
represented (INk) and each of the years (YRt) included in our sample, using industry- and 
year-specific fixed effects. Table 2A presents the descriptive statistics and correlation 
matrix of our sample; Table 2B displays the same information for the untransformed raw 
data.  
 
So as to check for the possibility of linear dependencies in the explanatory variables, we 
undertook a multicollinearity diagnostic test. The mean variance inflation factor (VIF) 
was 3.75. Including polynomials of ownership-based governance, royalty rate and 
clustering, the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) rose to 6.83, but remains below 10 
(Hair et al. 1995), suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern. 
 
Model Estimation 
 
To understand the impact of franchise system growth on the termination behavior of the 
franchisor, we have to account for multiple complexities. First, we have missing data 
with respect to franchisor terminations for some franchise systems and some years, and 
need to account for the possibility that these data may not be missing at random. 
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Second, our dependent variable (franchisor terminations (FTit) is operationalized at the 
franchise system level (group or macro level) and is predicted by independent variables 
measured at the same systemwide level (royalty rate (RRit) and clustering (CLit)) as well 
as those measured at the US state level (individual or micro level) (franchise system 
growth (GRijt) and ownership-based governance (OGijt)). Snijders and Bosker (1999) call 
this a micro-macro multilevel situation. A seemingly possible way to obtain good 
estimates of the regression parameters in micro-macro situation would involve either 
disaggregating or aggregating the data. In the disaggregation approach, individuals 
receive scores on a group-level variable by assigning them their group score on that 
variable, i.e., all subjects in a particular group receive the same score on the 
corresponding individual-level variable, which reduces the variability in the data. In the 
aggregation approach, all variables are transformed into variables measured at the group 
level by assigning each group its average score on any individual-level variable, which 
similar to the disaggregation approach, also reduces the variability in the data yielding 
inappropriate estimates of the standard errors of the regression parameters. Therefore, 
regression analyses carried out in micro-macro situations most likely result in biased 
parameter estimates (Croon and Veldhoven 2007). Modeling the relationship between 
variables at different levels is therefore problematic (Croon and Veldhoven 2007). 
Without necessary level adjustments, the results may be generalized to an inappropriate 
level, because relationships among variables that hold at one level may not necessarily 
hold at another level (Snijders and Bosker 1999). It is therefore important to address this 
level adjustment bias. 
 
Third, our variables of interest – franchise system growth (GRijt), ownership-based 
governance (OGijt), royalty rate (RRit), and clustering (CLit) – are typically strategic 
choices rather than random assignments, and hence are potentially endogenous. Our 
model specification approach must therefore account for the potential endogeneity of our 
regressors. We now describe each stage of our model specification approach in greater 
detail. 
 
33 
 
Stage 1: Correction for sample-induced endogeneity. So as to account for missing data 
with respect to our dependent variable, we specify a Heckman selection equation as 
follows:  
 
(1) INCLUDEit = γ0 + γ1 GRijt + γ2 OGijt + γ3 (OGijt)2 + γ4 RRit + γ5 (RRit)2 
                    + γ6 CLit + γ7 (CLit)2 + γ8 FAit + γ9 FSit + γ10 IFit + γ11 PPjt  
                    + γ12 INCjt + γ13 TXjt + γ14 GDPjt + γ15 ARj + γ16 DHij + γ17 MEit  
                                                    + ∑ γr=28r=18 r YRt + ∑ γ
p=38
p=29 p INk + εit 
Where, 
 
INCLUDEit = Franchise system i’s availability of franchisor terminations information at 
time t,  
GRijt = Franchise system growth, 
OGijt = Ownership-based governance,  
RRit = Royalty rate (natural log-transformed), 
CLit = Clustering of outlets,  
(OGijt)
2, (RRit)
2, (CLit)
2 = Quadratic terms of ownership-based governance, royalty rate, 
and clustering, so as to discern potential ceiling effects, 
FAit = Franchise system age, 
FSit = Franchise system size (natural log-transformed), 
IFit = Initial franchise fee (natural log-transformed), 
PPjt = Market population (natural log-transformed), 
INCjt = Market income (natural log-transformed), 
TXjt = Market taxes (natural log-transformed), 
GDPjt = Market GDP (natural log-transformed), 
ARj = Market area (natural log-transformed), 
DHij = Distance from headquarters (natural log-transformed), 
MEit = Market experience, 
YRt = Year-specific fixed effects, 
INk = Industry-specific fixed effects, and  
εit ~ N (μ, σ2). 
 
Following Certo, Busenbark, Woo, and Semadeni’s (2016) guidelines, we include all our 
explanatory variables of interest – franchise system growth (GRijt), ownership-based 
governance (OGijt), royalty rate (RRit), clustering (CLit) and their polynomials – and control 
variables in the selection equation. The role of explanatory variables in the selection 
equation is important because the suitability of the Heckman selection model rests on the 
significance of both explanatory variables and lambda (Certo, Busenbark, Woo, and 
Semadeni 2016). The selection parameter created in this stage, the Inverse Mills Ratio 
(IMRit), is then included in the substantive equation estimation. 
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Stage 2: Correction for micro-macro level. Our substantive equation estimation 
investigates the impact of franchise system growth, ownership-based governance, royalty 
rate, and clustering on franchisor terminations of franchisees. We specify our model as: 
 
(2) FTit = η0 + η1 GRij(t-1) + η2 OGij(t-1) + η3 (OGij(t-1))2 + η4 RRi(t-1) + η5 (RRi(t-1))2  
       + η6 CLi(t-1) + η7 (CLi(t-1))2 + η8 GRij(t-1) * OGij(t-1) + η9 GRij(t-1) * RRi(t-1) 
                                 + η10 GRij(t-1) * CLi(t-1) + η11 FAi(t-1) + η12 FSi(t-1) + η13 IFi(t-1) + η14 PPj(t-1)  
                      + η15 INCj(t-1) + η16 TXj(t-1) + η17 ARj + η18 GDPj(t-1) + η19 DHij  
                      + η20 IMRi(t-1) + ∑ ηr=31r=21 r YRt-1 + ∑ η
p=41
p=32 p INk +uit 
 
Where all terms are as described previously, and   
 
FTit = Count of franchisor terminations (natural log-transformed),  
IMRit = Inverse Mills Ratio from Heckman selection model, and 
uit = Random error 
 
We use one-year lagged values of predictors to be more precise on the specific direction 
of causality and to reduce the possibility of endogeneity bias due to simultaneity (Sande 
and Ghosh 2014). It is clear from Equation 2 that our dependent variable, franchisor 
terminations (FTit), is a franchise system level (group or macro level) variable. Two of 
our explanatory variables of interest, franchise system growth (GRijt) and ownership-
based governance (OGijt) are the US state level (individual or micro level) variables. 
Other variables of interest: clustering (CLit) and royalty rate (RRit) are at the franchise 
system level (group or macro level). 
 
Croon and Veldhoven (2007) propose a latent variable-based adjustment of predictors for 
analyzing micro-macro data. Their method uses the best linear unbiased predictors of the 
group means and yields unbiased estimates of the parameters. As our data also relates to 
micro-macro situation, we make level adjustment for our micro variables at the individual 
US state level and convert them to macro level at the franchise system level across 50 US 
states by using Croon and Veldhoven’s (2007) suggested approach. 
Per Equation 2, two micro level explanatory variables of interest need level adjustment – 
GRijt and OGijt. Although macro level variables do not require level adjustment, they are 
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used in the adjustment procedure for the micro level variables. The level adjustment 
procedure includes computing weight matrices W1 and W2, which require estimates of 
mean, variance and covariance matrices of micro and macro level variables respectively. 
Once computed, weight matrices W1 and W2 help estimate adjusted variables. Following 
this procedure, we compute and use adjusted variables 𝐺?̃?it (mean = .27, sd = 2.02) and 
𝑂?̃?it (mean = .08, sd = .11) in our substantive equation estimation instead of unadjusted 
variables GRijt (mean = .29, sd = 4.20) and OGijt (mean = .07, sd = .21) respectively. 
Appendix 2A provides more information on Croon and Veldhoven’s (2007) micro-macro 
level adjustment procedure. We re-specify our model in Equation 2 with adjusted 
variables as follows: 
 
(3)   FTit = β0 + β1 GR̃i(t-1) + β2 OG̃i(t-1) + β3 (OG̃i(t-1))2 + β4 RRi(t-1) + β5 (RRi(t-1))2  
       + β6 CLi(t-1) + β7 (CLi(t-1))2 + β8 GR̃i(t-1) * OG̃i(t-1) + β9 GR̃i(t-1) * RRi(t-1) + β10 GR̃i(t-1) * CLi(t-1)                    
           + β11 FAi(t-1) + β12 FSi(t-1) + β13 IFi(t-1) + β14 PPj(t-1) + β15 INCj(t-1) + β16 TXj(t-1) 
       + β17 ARj + β18 GDPj(t-1) + β19 DHij + β20 IMRi(t-1) + ∑ βr=31r=21 r YRt-1 + ∑ β
p=41
p=32 p INk + eit  
 
Where all terms are as described previously, and adjusted variables are  
 
GR̃it = Franchise system growth (level adjusted), and 
OG̃it = Ownership-based governance (level adjusted) 
 
After level correction, adjusted variables are now at the macro level in line with other 
macro level variables in our model. This adjustment eliminates the micro-macro level 
discrepancy as well as the potential bias created by it.  
 
Stage 3: Correction for other sources of endogeneity. We account for the endogeneity of 
our regressors (𝐺?̃?it, 𝑂?̃?it, RRit, CLit) by relying on the control function approach (Petrin 
and Train 2010). This approach uses exclusion restrictions to mitigate endogeneity 
concerns through a two-step procedure – an auxiliary estimation and then the substantive 
equation estimation – and has been used in several prior studies in marketing (Sridhar et 
al. 2016; Sridhar and Srinivasan 2012; Wang, Saboo, and Grewal 2015). 
 
First, we perform an auxiliary estimation with the potential endogenous variable as the 
dependent variable and include our exgoneous variables as predictors. We include two 
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predictor variables as the exclusion restrictions that directly affect the endogenous 
regressor but do not affect our ultimate dependent variable. So as to meet the relevance 
requirements of a valid exclusion restriction, we rely on the insight that firms are prone to 
mimetic isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), such that their behavior is 
likely to be similar to and drawing from relevant other firms or peer group in their 
operating environment. As well, there is no reason to expect that these peers’ past 
behavior will directly influence the outcome realized by the focal party. This approach to 
create excluded variables has been used in prior marketing studies (e.g., Kumar, Sunder, 
and Leone 2014; Sridhar, Germann, Kang, and Grewal 2016). Accordingly, we use one-
year lagged average measures of franchise system growth, ownership-based governance, 
royalty rate, and clustering by franchise systems in the same two-digit NAICS code as the 
exclusion restrictions. Here, the underlying assumption is that these lagged industry 
average measures remain unaffected by firm-level idiosyncratic shocks and cannot 
correlate strongly with the residuals in Equation 3 (Lev and Sougiannis 1996). As per 
Germann, Ebbes, and Grewal (2015), we paid careful attention to the number of firms 
“forming a peer group” (page 9, footnote 9); accordingly, we excluded focal firm from 
the peer group and dropped peer groups with fewer than seven firms in our sample.   
 
Additionally, we use firm-specific time-invariant predictor – franchised year fixed (FYRi) 
– as another exclusion restriction for each of our endogenous regressors. We measure 
franchised year fixed (FYRi) as the number of years elapsed since the year of 
establishment of a franchise system i until its first year of observation in our data set. The 
firm-specific time-invariant variable is most likely to be associated with our potential 
regressors, but is less likely to impact our dependent variable of interest (Antia, Mani, 
and Wathne 2017).   
 
To assess the endogeneity of our regressors and the validity of exclusion restrictions, we 
conducted several tests. First, we tested whether our proposed endogenous regressors 
could be treated as exogenous. This endogeneity test used the difference of two Sargan-
Hansen statistics (C statistic), where the test statistic is distributed as a chi-square with 
degrees of freedom equal to 1 for each of our endogenous regressors. The test rejects the 
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null hypothesis of exogeneity at p < .01 for each of our endogenous regressors. Second, 
our F-statistic of excluded instruments in the first stage was above the rule-of-thumb 10 
(Staiger and Stock 1997). Third, we used Sargan-Hansen’s J-statistic for the relevancy of 
exclusion restrictions. The Sargan-Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions, 
where the joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid, i.e., uncorrelated with the 
error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated 
equation. The test fails to reject the null hypothesis. Overall, these tests provide evidence 
of the endogeneity of our regressors and the validity of our exclusion restrictions. 
 
Using these exclusion restrictions, we obtain predicted residuals for our four potential 
endogenous regressors, which we include as covariates in our substantive equation. Our 
final model is:  
 
(4)     FTit = η0 + η1 GR̃i(t-1) + η2 OG̃i(t-1) + η3 (OG̃i(t-1))2 + η4 RRi(t-1) + η5 (RRi(t-1))2  
                 + η6 CLi(t-1) + η7 (CLi(t-1))2 + η8 GR̃i(t-1) * OG̃i(t-1) + η9 GR̃i(t-1) * RRi(t-1)  
                 + η10 GR̃i(t-1) * CLi(t-1) + η11 FAi(t-1) + η12 FSi(t-1) + η13 IFi(t-1) + η14 PPj(t-1)  
                 + η15 INCj(t-1) + η16 TXj(t-1) + η17 ARj + η18 GDPj(t-1) + η19 DHij 
                          + η20 IMRi(t-1) + ∑ ηr=31r=21 r YRt-1 + ∑ ηP=41p=32 p INk  
                 + δ1 res_GR̃it + δ2 res_OG̃it + δ3 res_RRit + δ4 res_CLit + eit  
 
Where all terms in our final model are as described previously and δ1-δ4 capture the effect 
of the first stage prediction residuals on the dependent variable. We estimate Equation 4 
above using a generalized least square (GLS) random-effects panel regression method.  
 
Results 
 
Heckman selection model. Table 3 displays the results of our first-stage Heckman 
selection model. The Inverse Mills Ratio is significant (λ = -1.30, p < .01) suggesting a 
selection bias, as we expected. The negative lambda coefficient implies that the 
unobservable variables in the selection model are negatively correlated with those in the 
final (substantive equation) model. We find that franchise systems with greater clustering 
are less likely to report franchisor terminations information, but at a diminishing rate (γ6 
= -6.09, p < .01; γ7 = 6.03, p < .01). Further, franchise systems with a greater initial 
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franchise fee (γ10 = -.04, p < .01) and distance from headquarters (γ16 = -.02, p < .05) are 
less likely to provide terminations information. In contrast, older (γ8 = .00, p < .01), 
larger (γ9 = .06, p < .01), and more experienced (γ17 = .01, p < .01) franchise systems are 
more likely to provide franchisor terminations information. Royalty rate has an inverted 
U-shaped relationship (γ4 = -.07, n.s.; γ5 = -.08, p < .01) with the availability of 
terminations information. Other factors had no discernible impact on the termination 
information selection. 
 
Substantive equation estimation. Table 4 displays the results of the generalized least 
square (GLS) random-effects panel regression estimates of three models. We include just 
our main variables of interest in Model 1. In Model 2, we also include the control 
variables. Model 3 is our full model including all variables of interest, covariates, 
interaction terms, and residuals from auxiliary estimation. As is clear from Table 4, these 
additions produce significant improvement in model fit (χ2Model 1 = 657.11, p < .01; χ2Model 
2 = 3462.49, p < .01; χ2Model 3 = 3832.75, p < .01). Our discussion will focus on Model 3, 
i.e., the full model. 
 
The first result to note is that greater franchise system growth significantly increases 
franchisor terminations of franchisees (η1 = .31, p < .01). This finding supports 
hypothesis H1 which stated that higher growth is likely to be associated with more 
terminations.  
 
Although not hypothesized, several interesting results related to the main effects of 
ownership-based governance, royalty rate, and clustering are worth noting. An 
examination of their estimated coefficients suggests that ownership-based governance is 
associated with increasing terminations (η2 = 1.47, p < .01), but subject to a diminishing 
rate (η3 = -2.92, p < .05). Royalty rate decreases terminations (η4 = -2.75, p < .01) at a 
diminishing rate (η5 = .24, p < .01). An increase in clustering is also associated with a 
decrease in number of terminations (η6 = -9.06, p < .01).  
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We now turn our attention to the estimates pertaining to how this growth is achieved. Our 
second hypothesis H2 predicted a negative effect of the ownership-based governance on 
franchise system growth and terminations relationship. This hypothesis would find 
support if we were to find a negative association between franchise systems’ reliance on 
their own outlets for growth and the number of franchisor terminations. We find 
significant support for hypothesis H2. Relying on their own outlets when growing, 
franchise systems decrease the incidence of franchisor terminations (η8 = -.83, p < .01).  
 
Hypothesis H3 predicted a negative association between the franchise system growth 
reliant on high royalty rate and franchisor terminations of franchisees. This hypothesis 
would find support if we were to find a negative association between franchise systems’ 
reliance on high royalty rate for growth and the number of franchisor terminations. We 
find strong support of hypothesis H3. Franchise systems are less likely to terminate 
franchisees when they rely on higher royalty rate while they grow (η9 = -.40, p < .01).  
 
Finally, our hypothesis H4 anticipated a decrease in franchisor terminations pursuant to 
clustering-reliant system growth. The pairwise interaction involving franchise system 
growth and clustering is found significant and negative (η10 = -2.58, p < .01), which 
shows that clustering-reliant growth decreases franchisor terminations. We therefore find 
support for H4. 
 
With respect to control variables, we find that franchise system age (η11 = .01, p < 
.01), franchise system size (η12 = .25, p < .01), and initial franchise fee (η13 = .15, p < 
.01) significantly and positively impact the termination incidence. We also find that 
the inverse mills ratio (η20 = .79, p < .01) significantly and positively affects 
terminations, which suggests that if the selection bias were unaccounted for, the 
estimated franchisor terminations would be overstated. Other covariates do not have a 
discernable impact on franchisor terminations.  
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Post hoc Analyses of Significant Interactions 
 
So as to gain a better understanding of how ownership-based governance, royalty rate, 
and clustering temper the relationship between franchise system growth and franchisor 
terminations, we conducted a floodlight analysis using the Johnson-Neyman (JN) 
procedure (Spiller et al. 2013). Table 7 displays the results corresponding to the 
significant two-way interactions and Figure 2 graphs the simple slopes.  
 
For ownership-based governance (OG), the JN lower bound occurs at .12 suggesting the 
simple slope of franchise system growth (GR) on terminations (FT) is significant below 
this point. The results show that at low levels of ownership-based governance, franchise 
systems pursuing growth significantly increase terminations (simple slope of GR under 
Low OG = .32, p < .01), and at high levels of ownership-based governance, franchise 
systems pursuing growth partially decrease terminations (simple slope of GR under High 
OG = -.21, p < .10).  
 
The range of royalty rate (RR) is from 0 to 3.04. The JN lower and upper bounds occur at 
.26 and 1.27 respectively, suggesting the simple slope of franchise system growth on 
terminations is significant between 0 and .26, and between 1.27 and 3.04. The moderating 
effect of royalty rate on franchise system growth and terminations is found significant 
and positive at low levels (simple slope of GR under Low RR = .31, p < .01), and 
significant and negative at high levels (simple slope of GR under High RR = -.90, p < 
.01).  
 
The moderating effect of clustering (CL) on franchise system growth (GR) and 
terminations (FT) fares similar to royalty rate. The range of clustering (CL) is from .03 to 
1. The JN upper bound of .21 lies within this continuum, suggesting the simple slope of 
franchise system growth (GR) on terminations (FT) is significant between the interval .21 
to 1. At low levels of clustering, franchise systems pursuing growth significantly increase 
the number of franchisor terminations (simple slope of GR under Low CL = .23, p < .05), 
and at high levels of clustering, they significantly decrease the number of franchisor 
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terminations (simple slope of GR under High CL = -2.27, p < .01). The moderating effect 
of clustering on franchise system growth and terminations is therefore significant at both 
low and high levels. 
 
Overall, we obtain clear evidence that franchise systems’ reliance on ownership-based 
governance, royalty rate, or clustering to fuel their growth significantly and negatively 
affects their tendency to terminate franchisees. 
 
Alternate Specifications 
 
We assessed the stability of our findings to alternate estimation approaches, alternate 
measures of growth, alternate time-related specifications, and alternative levels of 
analysis. 
 
Alternate estimator. In order to test the robustness of our results, we used the random-
effects negative binomial model (RENB). RENB regression fits a random-effects over-
dispersion model for a count dependent variable. The mean of our raw count dependent 
variable (without natural log-transformation) is almost half that of its variance, which 
makes the RENB estimation suitable to our purpose. All our results with respect to the 
hypothesized effects remain robust to this alternate estimator. 
 
Alternate measures of growth. Instead of a smoothed (up to 5-year) moving average of 
growth, we reduced one year and relied on a 4-year smoothed moving average of growth 
as an alternate measure. Our random effects panel regression results remain robust to this 
alternate measure of growth as well. Further, we assessed the impact of year-over-year 
(YOY) franchise system growth on the franchisor terminations. Our results indicate that 
YOY growth that relies on ownership-based governance or royalty rate decreases 
terminations, but relying on clustering increases terminations. Results from this model 
specification therefore exhibit discrepancies with respect to our smoothed 5-year or 4-
year growth trend models, which bring to light the importance of using a growth trend 
instead of YOY growth that is more prone to fluctuations.   
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Alternate temporal separation. Our conceptualization and subsequent model specification 
approach have proceeded on the assumption of one-year lagged values of explanatory 
variables. We also assessed contemporaneous (immediate, within the same year) effects 
of predictors on the number of franchisor terminations. All our findings with respect to 
tempering effects of ownership-based governance, royalty rate, and clustering on 
franchise system growth-terminations relationship remain robust to this alternate 
temporal separation.  
 
Alternate level of analysis. We also specified an alternate model by using unadjusted 
growth and ownership-based governance variables, i.e., without using Croon and 
Veldhoven’s (2007) suggested adjustment approach. The results show that clustering and 
royalty rate only partially impact franchise system growth and terminations relationship. 
Our decision to adjust micro-level variables as per Croon and Veldhoven’s approach 
therefore appears warranted. 
 
The Financial Consequences of Franchisor Terminations 
  
We also assessed the impact of franchisor terminations on two highly relevant 
financial outcomes for the franchise system – sales and profitability. Information on 
overall franchise system sales revenue (SRit) is obtained on an annual basis from the 
FDD; we used the annual financial statements to compute system-wide net profit ratio 
(PRit) as the ratio of franchisors’ after tax profit to their net sales.   
 
Both metrics are of immense relevance to franchisors and their key stakeholders alike 
(Burkitt 2015; Jargon 2015) as well as to scholars of growth (DeKinder and Kohli 
2008; Palmatier et al. 2013). With greater number of franchisor terminations brought 
about by greater detection of violations and enforcement, franchisees’ self-motivation 
to perform increases (Klein 1980; 1995), in turn leading to lesser shirking, higher 
compliance, and quality provision (Bercovitz 2003; Rubin 1990). End-customer 
satisfaction with the product offering correspondingly increases (Rust and Oliver 
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1994) as does repeat purchase (Taylor and Baker 1994), resulting in higher sales 
achieved by the franchise system. The costs associated with the franchisor policing of 
franchisee compliance with the agreement are also reduced (Kashyap, Antia, and 
Frazier 2012), thereby increasing the profit associated with the achieved sales. 
Franchise system sales also matter for franchisors due to their reliance on royalty 
payments which are calculated as a percentage of franchisees’ sales, whereas 
profitability is important to franchisors to spur further growth and attract new 
franchisees.  
 
After accounting for control variables listed in Table 1 and using contemporaneous, 
one-year lagged, and two-year lagged models, we find that franchise system sales 
suffer immediately as franchisor terminations increase (Coeff. = -.16, p < .01), but 
they significantly recover later (Coeff.one-year lag = .21; Coeff.two-year lag = .13, p < .01). 
Contrary to sales, we find that profitability improves in the immediate aftermath of 
terminations (Coeff. = .97, p < .01), and this improvement persists in later years 
(Coeff.one-year lag = .79, p < .01; Coeff.two-year lag = 5.78, p < .05). These results suggest 
that pruning of bad franchisees harms franchise system sales in the short run, but 
profitability improves as stronger, more compliant, and better performing franchisees 
remain in the system.    
 
Discussion 
 
The present study assesses an issue of fundamental importance to firms: How does 
franchise system growth impact franchisor terminations, and subsequently, system sales 
and profits? Within the context of franchising, characterized as it is by partners’ mutual 
reliance on each other, growth-related consequences take on even more importance. 
Potential franchisees are advised to “…make sure the franchise has the long-term 
viability associated with vibrant growth, but also that it's not growing too fast to manage 
the issues associated with this growth” (Elgin 2005). To the best of our knowledge, 
however, guidance as to the growth rate appropriate to both the preceding imperatives is 
as yet forthcoming. Our analysis of 75 franchise systems observed over up to 12 years as 
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they increase their retail footprint across all 50 US states provides just such guidance. We 
hypothesize and find evidence of the interplay of growth, governance (ownership and 
royalty rate), and geography (clustering) significantly shifting the impact of growth on 
firms’ financial outcomes via the inducement of franchisee compliance, i.e., the strength 
of the self-enforcement mechanism. Our synthesis of three well-established theoretical 
perspectives – agency theory, governance, and clustering – extends our understanding of 
growth beyond its current emphasis on how much to how such growth might occur. 
 
Likely because “hard” information on actual behaviors and financial outcomes is so 
difficult to collect for non-publicly held firms, prior research has tended to focus on 
franchisee compliance and perceptions, either self-reported (Kashyap, Antia, and Frazier 
2012) or as reported by the franchisor (Antia and Frazier 2001). Relying on regulation-
required disclosure documents, the present research establishes a clear linkage between 
actual franchisor terminations and franchise system sales and profits. Our work provides 
much needed evidence of franchisor behavior-attributable performance outcomes.   
 
We find that, by itself, growth in the number of outlets in each market the system 
operates in is associated with a significant increase in the number of franchisor 
terminations system-wide.  This positive association, however, is not necessarily a bad 
outcome. Consistent with anecdotal (yet hitherto untested) claims that franchisor 
terminations help weed out “the bad eggs” (i.e., noncompliant franchisees), we do find 
that in the aftermath of such terminations (i.e., up to the two-year duration we tested for), 
terminations result in increased system-wide sales and profits. We attribute these positive 
effects of termination to the system-wide signal of franchisor commitment to system 
integrity they represent (Antia and Frazier 2001), and their corresponding franchisee 
effort-eliciting impact (Agrawal and Lal 1995). The contemporaneous yet short-lived 
negative effect of franchisor terminations on sales is a small price to pay for longer-term 
system integrity, particularly keeping in mind the immediate and positive gain in system-
wide profits.  
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Findings from our study suggest that in addition to the extent of growth, how such growth 
occurs is of critical importance. We find evidence that franchisors’ reliance on 
ownership-based governance, higher royalty rates, and clustering of its outlets each aid in 
strengthening the self-enforcement mechanism. This is manifest in a weakening of the 
positive association between system-wide growth and franchisor terminations. Each of 
the preceding three mechanisms serves the purpose of increasing the franchisees’ 
anticipated stream of rents and/or the credible threat of their termination by the 
franchisor, thereby increasing the self-enforcing range of the franchise agreement. Just as 
power resides in a reduced necessity for its exercise (Frazier 1983), so do the self-
enforcing terms result in lower observed terminations system-wide.   
 
Ownership-based governance and the simultaneous reliance on own and partner inputs 
that it implies enjoy a time-honored status as an effective governance mechanism (Dutta 
et al. 1995; Heide 2003; Monteverde and Teece 1982). Our work builds on this 
foundation, and finds that franchisors’ reliance on this mechanism when growing its retail 
footprint increases the strength of the self-enforcement mechanism; the number of 
franchisor terminations falls, consistent with the notion that ownership-based governance 
reduces the information asymmetry between the franchisor and its franchisees, and serves 
as a credible threat (Heide 2003).  
 
Our findings with respect to the effect of a higher royalty rate under conditions of high 
growth are also worth discussing. Consistent with prior research (Lafontaine l992; Lal 
1990), we do find evidence consistent with the notion that the royalty rate motivates 
franchisors’ monitoring and system integrity-maintaining efforts, thereby increasing the 
credible threat of termination and correspondingly increasing the self-enforcing range of 
the franchise agreement. The result is a significant weakening of the positive growth-
termination association. As well, albeit not hypothesized by us, the higher the royalty 
rate, the lower the observed franchisor terminations; beyond a point, however, raising the 
royalty rate further is counter-productive, as evidenced by the uptick in franchisor 
terminations (i.e., the quadratic term is positive and significant). Together, these findings 
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underscore the careful balance franchisors must strike when determining the appropriate 
royalty rate their franchisees must pay them.     
 
The assessment of clustering effects that we offer confirms empirically the insights 
offered by the nascent literature in marketing on the impact of geography (Bell, Tracey, 
and Heide 2009; Mittal, Kamakura, and Govind 2004; Tracey, Heide, and Bell 2014). 
The clustering of outlets is found to significantly strengthen the self-enforcement 
mechanism when growing the retail footprint. Further probing of the simple slopes of 
growth on franchisor terminations helps better understand its effect on the growth-
terminations association. As can be seen Figure 2 (third panel), growth in the number of 
outlets, when accompanied by a clustering-induced “critical mass” of outlets, is 
associated with a strengthened self-enforcement mechanism; in marked contrast, growth 
that relies on a lower level of clustering does not have any impact on the strength of self-
enforcement mechanism. It thus appears that the combination of high growth and 
clustering increases the self-enforcing range of the franchise agreement, and reduces the 
necessity for franchisor terminations.     
 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
As with any research, the present study is subject to some limitations. First, our reliance 
on longitudinal archival data, while affording rich insights into actual rather than reported 
behavior, cannot speak to the motivations underlying such behavior. All we can state is 
that the observed behavior patterns are not inconsistent with our hypothesized effects. 
Future work that synthesizes insights from archival and survey-collected micro-data, 
although difficult to conduct, would be very welcome. Second, the present study relates 
market- and system-level hypothesized predictors to the strength of the self-enforcement 
mechanism and subsequent financial outcomes at the system level. An assessment of 
market-level intermediate (e.g., terminations at market level) or final-stage outcomes 
would be a promising avenue for future research. Third, the data at hand precludes the 
ability to identify the specific location (street address and zip code) of individual outlets, 
whether franchisor- or franchisee-owned and operated. Such information, if available, 
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would provide rich insights on proximity-induced intra- and inter-brand competitive 
effects. 
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TABLE 1 
VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
 
Construct 
 
Measure Notation Data Source 
Franchisor Terminations 
The count of franchisor terminations of 
franchisees for franchise system i in year t 
FTit Franchise Disclosure Documents 
Franchise System 
Growth 
A smoothed multi-year moving average (up 
to 5-year) of change in number of outlets  
GRijt 
Bond’s Franchise Guide  
(Computed from annual number of 
outlets in each US state)  
Ownership-Based 
Governance 
Ratio of franchisor-owned outlets to the 
total number of outlets for franchise system 
i in US state j in year t 
OGijt Bond’s Franchise Guide 
Royalty Rate 
The ongoing payment as a percentage of 
sales in of franchise system i in year t 
RRit Bond’s Franchise Guide 
Clustering 
Concentration of outlets of franchise system 
i in year t as measured by the Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index (HHI) 
CLit 
Bond’s Franchise Guide  
(Computed from annual number of 
outlets in each US state) 
 
Control Variables 
 
Franchise System Age 
Number of years elapsed since year of 
establishment of franchise system i in year t 
FAit Bond’s Franchise Guide 
Franchise System Size 
Number of franchised outlets operated by 
franchise system i in year t 
FSit Bond’s Franchise Guide 
Initial Franchise Fee 
The one-time fee paid by new franchisees in 
year t 
IFit Bond’s Franchise Guide 
Market Population 
(millions) 
Population of state j in year t PPjt US Census Bureau 
Income (millions) Income per capita in state j in year t INCjt Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Market Taxes 
Total state per capita taxes paid in state j in 
year t 
TXjt Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Market GDP (millions) GDP of state j in year t GDPjt Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Market Area (square 
miles) 
Area of state j ARj US Census Bureau 
Distance from 
Headquarters (miles) 
The geodesic distance of the outlets of 
franchise system i in state j from the capital 
of the US state where firm i is 
headquartered 
DHij Computed variable using ArcGIS 
Market Experience 
Count of US states in which franchise 
system i is present in year t  
MEit Bond’s Franchise Guide 
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TABLE 2A 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX 
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 aFranchisor Terminations FTit -                           
2 Franchise System Growth GRijt -0.02 -              
3 Ownership-Based Governance OGijt -0.06 -0.01 -             
4 
aRoyalty Rate RRit -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -            
5 Clustering
 CLit -0.10 -0.03 -0.10 -0.05 -          
6 Franchise System Age FAit 0.22 0.03 0.08 -0.02 -0.17 -          
7 
aFranchise System Size FSit 0.39 0.10 -0.03 0.17 -0.57 0.33 -         
8 
aInitial Franchise Fee IFit -0.21 -0.01 0.07 0.15 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -        
9 
aMarket Population PPjt 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -       
10 
aIncome (per capita) INCjt 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.26 -      
11 
aMarket Taxes TXjt 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.37 0.75 -     
12 
aMarket GDP GDPjt 0.01 0.05 0.13 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.95 0.41 0.47 -    
13 
aMarket Area ARj 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 -0.26 -0.47 0.13 -   
14 
aDistance from Headquarters DHij 0.01 -0.03 -0.11 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.17 0.03 -0.02 -0.16 0.02 - 
  Mean   1.75 0.29 0.07 1.73 0.16 25.49 5.00 9.68 15.03 10.53 8.16 11.60 10.75 7.10 
  SD   1.38 4.20 0.21 0.53 0.19 12.98 1.78 1.80 1.05 0.16 0.23 1.06 1.10 1.24 
 
n1= 25,600 
Correlations exceeding |.01| are significant at p < .05, two-tailed 
a: Natural log-transformed 
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TABLE 2B 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX (RAW VALUES) 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Franchisor Terminations FTit 1.00              
2 Franchise System Growth GRijt 0.00 1.00             
3 Ownership-Based Governance OGijt -0.08 -0.01 1.00            
4 Royalty Rate RRit 0.27 0.00 -0.07 1.00           
5 Clustering CLit -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 -0.09 1.00          
6 Franchise System Age FAit 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.05 -0.17 1.00         
7 Franchise System Size FSit 0.36 0.14 0.03 0.28 -0.27 0.38 1.00        
8 Initial Franchise Fee IFit -0.15 -0.04 0.12 -0.08 0.07 -0.09 -0.14 1.00       
9 Market Population PPjt 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00      
10 Income (per capita) INCjt 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.27 1.00     
11 Market Taxes TXjt 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.31 0.80 1.00    
12 Market GDP GDPjt 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.98 0.36 0.39 1.00   
13 Market Area ARj 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 -0.02 -0.36 0.09 1.00  
14 Distance from Headquarters DHij 0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.06 0.13 0.04 -0.04 0.22 1.00 
 Mean  14.54 0.29 0.07 5.33 0.16 25.49 501.6 24620 5.55
b 37892 3603 0.19b 75902 1733 
 SD  27.66 4.20 0.21 2.88 0.19 12.98 901.4 12732 6.07
b 6330 880 0.23b 96099 1242 
 
n1= 25,600 
Correlations exceeding |.01| are significant at p < .05, two-tailed 
b: Millions 
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TABLE 3  
HECKMAN SELECTION MODEL ESTIMATES 
 
bInclude 
 
 
Notation Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
z value 
Intercept γ0  1.05 .99 1.07 
Franchise System Growth γ1 GRijt .00 .00 .89 
 
Ownership-Based 
Governance 
 
γ2 OGijt -.37 .21 -1.78 
γ3 (OGijt)
2 .38 .23 1.60 
aRoyalty Rate 
γ4 RRit -.07 .07 -1.00 
γ5 (RRit)
2 -.08** .03 -3.14 
Clustering 
γ6 CLit -6.09** .30 -20.29 
γ7 (CLit)
2 6.03** .31 19.45 
Franchise System Age γ8 FAit .00** .00 4.44 
aFranchise System Size γ9 FSit .06** .01 4.69 
aInitial Franchise Fee γ10 IFit -.04** .00 -5.54 
aMarket Population γ11 PPjt -.00 .04 -.00 
aIncome (per capita) γ12 INCjt .02 .11 .17 
aMarket Taxes γ13 TXjt -.00 .09 .05 
aMarket GDP γ14 GDPjt -.00 .04 -.07 
aMarket Area γ15 ARj .00 .01 .25 
aDistance from Headquarters γ16 DHij -.02* .01 -2.38 
Market Experience  γ17 MEit .01** .00 3.17 
Year Fixed Effects γ18-28 YRt Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects γ29-38 INk Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratio 
Lambda Λ  -1.30** .18    -7.11 
 
Number of Observations = n1 = 19,950, Wald χ2 = 5892.59 (p < .01) 
a: Natural log-transformed  
b: Franchise system i’s availability of franchisor terminations information at time t 
*p < .05, **p < .01, two-tailed 
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TABLE 4 
GENERALIZED LEAST SQUARE (GLS) RANDOM-EFFECTS PANEL REGRESSION ESTIMATES 
 
 
Model 1 
Main Effects Only 
Model 2  
With Control Variables 
Model 3 
Full Model 
aFranchisor Terminations (FTit)  Notation Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Intercept η0  3.14** .09 -.38 1.28 3.75** 1.27 
Franchise System Growth η1 𝐺?̃?i(t-1) .02** .01 -.03** .01 .31** .11 
Ownership-Based Governance 
η2 𝑂?̃? i(t-1) .76* .36 1.15** .38 1.47** .43 
η3 (𝑂?̃? i(t-1))2 -6.06** .98 -2.93** 1.04 -2.92* 1.15 
aRoyalty Rate 
η4 RRi(t-1) -1.50** .10 -1.90** .10 -2.75** .19 
η5 (RRi(t-1))2 .51** .03 .52** .03 .24** .04 
Clustering 
η6 CLi(t-1) -3.81** .30 -6.58** .63 -9.06** 1.61 
η7 (CLi(t-1))2 2.94** .32 6.92** .62 1.09 .75 
Franchise System Growth * Ownership-Based Governance η8 𝐺?̃?i(t-1) * 𝑂?̃? i(t-1)     -.83** .08 
Franchise System Growth * Royalty Rate η9 𝐺?̃?i(t-1) * RRi(t-1)     -.40** .03 
Franchise System Growth * Clustering η10 𝐺?̃?i(t-1) * CLi(t-1)     -2.58** .32 
Franchise System Age η11 FAi(t-1)   .00 .00 .01** .00 
aFranchise System Size η12 FSi(t-1)   .51** .02 .25** .08 
aInitial Franchise Fee η13 IFi(t-1)   .02 .01 .15** .02 
aMarket Population η14 PPj(t-1)   .00 .03 .00 .03 
aIncome (per capita) η15 INCj(t-1)   .03 .16 .00 .14 
aMarket Taxes η16 TXj(t-1)   .01 .12 .01 .12 
aMarket GDP η17 GDPj(t-1)   -.01 .03 -.01 .03 
aMarket Area η18 ARj   .00 .02 .00 .02 
aDistance from Headquarters η19 DHij   -.03* .01 -.02 .01 
Inverse Mills Ratio η20 IMRi(t-1)   2.17** .18 .79** .21 
Year Fixed Effects η21-31 YRt-1 No Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects η32-41 INk No Yes Yes 
Franchise System Growth Residuals δ1 AI_𝐺?̃?i(t-1)       .70** .10 
Ownership-Based Governance Residuals δ2 AI_𝑂?̃? i(t-1)     -1.24** .36 
Royalty Rate Residuals δ3 AI_RRi(t-1)       1.54** .18 
Clustering Residuals δ4 AI_CLi(t-1)       8.05** 1.35 
 Wald χ2 = 657.11** 
 
Wald χ2 = 3462.49** Wald χ2 = 3832.75** 
 
Number of Observations = n2 = 9,517; a: Natural log-transformed; *p < .05, **p < .01, two-tailed 
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TABLE 5  
SIMPLE SLOPES ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT INTERACTIONS 
 
 
 
Estimated Impact on 
Franchisor Terminations  
(Simple Slope) 
t-Value 
 
Impact of GR on FT at various levels of OG 
 
OG (Low) .32** 2.87 
OG (High) -.21+ -1.78 
 
Impact of GR on FT at various levels of RR 
 
RR (Low) .31** 2.83 
RR (High) -.90** -8.61 
 
Impact of GR on FT at various levels of CL 
 
CL (Low) .23* 2.11 
CL (High)       -2.27** -7.32 
 
   
FT: Franchisor Terminations, GR: Franchise System Growth, 
OG: Ownership-Based Governance, RR: Royalty Rate, CL: Clustering 
 
+p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, two-tailed 
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FIGURE 1 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
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FIGURE 2 
SIMPLE SLOPES ANALYSIS 
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APPENDIX 2A 
THE MICRO-MACRO LEVEL ADJUSTMENT PROCEDURE 
 
Croon and Veldhoven (2007) propose a latent variable-based adjustment of predictors for 
analyzing micro-macro data, which yields unbiased estimates of the parameters. Their 
approach, calls for the adjustment of the micro-level variables by computing weight 
matrices W1 and W2, which require estimates of the mean, variance and covariance 
matrices of micro and macro level variables. W1 and W2 are p x p and p x q matrices 
respectively, where p = number of micro-level variables and q = number of macro-level 
variables in the model. W2 will be zero in the absence of macro-level predictor variable in 
the model. Once computed, weight matrices W1 and W2 help estimate adjusted variables.  
 
Assuming a micro-macro level relationship that involves a macro-level dependent 
variable – terminations across all markets (Y), and a micro-level independent variable at 
the individual market-level (Xj) (where  j denotes the specific market) and a macro-level 
independent variable across all markets (Z). 
 
1)  Y = Xj + Z + e 
 
Where, e = Random error 
 
A seemingly appropriate way to obtain good estimates of the regression parameters in 
Equation 1 would consist of aggregating the micro-level scores (Xj) to the macro-level by 
determining the group mean (?̅?) and then regressing Y on both ?̅? and Z. However, this 
aggregated regression analysis will yield unbiased estimates of the regression parameters 
only if there is no within-group variability, which is an unrealistic scenario. 
 
The relationship between the micro-level variable and the macro-level (latent) variable 
score is given by 
 
2)  Xj = ?̅? + vj 
 
Where, 
 
X̅ = The latent macro-level variable, predicted by the mean variable score of Xj, 
vj = Random error 
 
Per Croon and Veldhoven’s (2007) suggested approach, this mean of the micro-level 
predictor (?̅?) will be adjusted to the macro-level (?̃?). To obtain unbiased estimates of the 
regression parameters, we regress Y on ?̃? (instead of ?̅?) and Z, i.e., 
 
3)  Y = ?̃? + Z + u 
 
Where, 
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X̃ = The adjusted variable, 
u = Random error 
 
 
The Level-Adjustment Procedure  
 
Croon and Veldhoven (2007) have proposed a three-step procedure to obtain unbiased 
parameter estimates in micro-macro level situations. 
 
a) The first step involves the estimation of weight matrices, W1 and W2. The 
computation of weight matrices requires the estimates of the mean, variance and 
covariance matrices of micro and macro level variables via standard ANOVA 
techniques, as follows:     
 
4)  W1 = (𝑆?̅??̅?  + 𝑆𝑣𝑣/nj - 𝑆?̅?𝑍(𝑆?̅??̅?)
-1𝑆𝑍?̅?)
-1 (𝑆?̅??̅? - 𝑆?̅?𝑍(𝑆?̅??̅?)
-1𝑆𝑍?̅?) 
 
5)   W2 = (𝑆𝑍𝑍)
-1 𝑆𝑍?̅? (Ipxp - W1) 
 
Where, 
 
S denotes a covariance matrix, 
nj = Number of observations at the micro-level, 
I   = Identity matrix  
 
b) In the second step, the adjusted predictor is estimated as 
 
6)   ?̃? = (?̅?)′ (Ipxp - W1) + (?̅?)′ W1 + (Z - ?̅?)′ W2 
 
c) Finally, a regression analysis of Y on ?̃? and Z is carried out as per Equation 3. The 
resulting estimates are unbiased (see Croon and Veldhoven (2007, page 52), for 
simulation-based evidence). 
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Chapter 3 
 
Clustering, Governance, and Individual Outlet Sales: 
A Multi-Year Analysis of an Evolving Franchise System 
(Resubmitted to Journal of Marketing on January 6th, 2017) 
 
“Any time you open more and more units, there’s always some impact…People are still making some 
money – it’s just not what they used to make.” – Hardy Grewal, Subway’s largest U.S. development agent. 
“Subways aren’t cannibalizing each other…restaurants in the most Subway-dense markets actually have 
higher average sales.” – Don Fertman, Subway’s chief development officer. 
- The Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2015. 
 
The preceding quotes exemplify the starkly divergent views regarding clustering − the 
geographic concentration of interconnected institutions (Porter 1998). On the one hand, 
clustering is known to elicit richer, more frequent interactions (Ganesan, Malter, and 
Rindfleisch 2005), thereby facilitating the transfer of relevant operating knowledge 
among outlets (Kalnins and Mayer 2004). On the other hand, the prospect of proximity-
induced intra-brand competition poses a daunting and real threat (Kalnins 2004; Pancras, 
Sriram, and Kumar 2012). In light of this, should the multiple same-brand outlets of a 
franchise system be clustered with or be distant from one another? For interested 
scholars and practitioners alike, the preceding question has profound implications yet 
remains largely unanswered.  
 
Table 1 summarizes extant empirical research on the performance-related consequences 
of the proximity of same-brand outlets. Scholars working within a sociological tradition 
of clustering theory (Ganesan, Malter, and Rindfleisch 2005; Ingram and Baum 1997) 
emphasize almost exclusively the proximity-induced opportunities for greater learning, 
interaction, and knowledge-sharing among closely located outlets, and the consequent 
performance gains for the focal entity participating in such a cluster (Lu and Wedig 
2013). The primarily economics-informed perspective on proximity (Kalnins 2004; 
Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012), however, emphasizes the costs imposed by the 
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resulting intra-brand competition. As evident from Table 1, prior studies have adopted a 
knowledge transfer or intra-brand competition-informed viewpoint. As a result, the 
intriguing possibility that both perspectives might be valid remains unexplored.   
 
The present study represents the first effort, to the best of our knowledge, to acknowledge 
and reconcile these seemingly conflicting effects of proximity. Within the context of a 
growing US-based franchise system, we take the perspective of the focal outlet seeking to 
leverage knowledge transferred from the proximal same-brand outlets it is clustered with, 
even while avoiding the sales cannibalization brought about by intra-brand competition. 
Our conceptual framework, grounded in the literature on organizational learning (e.g., 
Argote 2011; Darr and Kurtzberg 2000), integrates the Motivation-Opportunity-Ability 
(MOA) perspective (Argote, McEvily, and Reagans 2003; MacInnis, Moorman, and 
Jaworski 1991) with work on proximity-governance linkages (Bradach 1997; Brickley 
and Dark 1987; Tracey, Heide, and Bell 2014) to hypothesize the conditions under which 
each viewpoint – knowledge transfer or intra-brand competition – might prevail, as 
reflected in the focal outlet’s sales performance. 
 
Specifically, we posit that the opportunity to share knowledge afforded by clustering-
based proximity may or may not be realized, depending on (a) the motivation of the focal 
outlet to seek knowledge from its proximal outlets, and of the latter to transfer their 
knowledge to the focal outlet, (b) the ability of the proximal outlets to transfer relevant 
knowledge and the focal outlet to absorb such knowledge, and (c) the governance6 
context (i.e., shared ownership and whether franchisor- or franchisee-owned).  
 
The motivation of focal and proximal outlets to seek and transfer knowledge is 
hypothesized to vary as a function of shared ownership – i.e., the focal outlet is likely 
more motivated to seek knowledge from its proximal outlets, who in turn are likely more 
motivated to transfer knowledge to the focal outlet if they are owned by the same multi-
                                                          
6 We use the term “governance” to reflect the control- and coordination-related benefits conferred by 
organizational hierarchy (Williamson 1985, 1996). Henceforth, our use of the term governance refers to the 
ownership of the focal outlet.   
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unit franchisee. We also consider the ability inherent in the age-related experience of the 
outlets (reflected in the number of years elapsed since opening) – i.e., the proximal 
outlets’ availability of knowledge gained through years of experience, and the focal 
outlet’s ability to value, assimilate, and apply this knowledge – i.e., its absorptive 
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Furthermore, the extent to which the focal outlet 
might experience variation in the likelihood of intra-brand competition and have the 
latitude to act on the knowledge thus transferred and absorbed is expected to vary as a 
function of its governance − whether it is franchisor- or franchisee-owned. 
 
We rely on a unique multi-sourced dataset comprising more than 8,000 observations on 
the 988 outlets of a large US-based franchise system of automotive services across 41 US 
states, from its inception in 1977 to the year 2012. Top management of the franchise 
system shared data with respect to each outlet’s location, year of establishment, and 
corresponding sales information for a nine-year period from 2004 to 2012. We 
supplemented these with relevant information from franchise disclosure documents 
(FDD) and with market-specific information we collected from publicly available 
archival sources. The rich, fine-grained information provides a unique opportunity to 
assess the impact of clustering on individual outlets’ sales performance over time.   
 
We make several key contributions to our understanding of clustering and its 
performance consequences. First, rather than limit our consideration to just the beneficial, 
knowledge transfer effects of clustering or the potentially negative intra-brand 
competition effects, we explicitly acknowledge and assess both possibilities. We argue 
that the net impact of clustering on outlet sales depends on the relative strength of each of 
these competing effects, and identify the boundary conditions with respect to when one 
effect might dominate the other.  
 
Second, we build on evidence suggesting that the knowledge available from different 
outlets might vary as a function of their experience (Kalnins and Mayer 2004), and 
extend this insight by additionally considering the focal outlet’s ability to absorb this 
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available knowledge as a function of its own experience (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; 
Zahra and George 2002). As we will discuss subsequently, a low level of either is likely 
to significantly compromise knowledge transfer among outlets, resulting in reduced 
performance levels. We are thus able to explain how, even within the same cluster of 
outlets, performance might vary as a function of the specific focal outlet and the specific 
proximal same-brand outlets considered. In emphasizing the role of experience of 
proximally located knowledge sources and recipient alike, we extend the notion of 
clustering past its exclusive focus on how geographically close the outlets within a cluster 
are to the specific identities of the focal outlet and those proximal to it.  
 
Third, we build on and extend recent theoretical discussions (Bell, Tracey, and Heide 
2009; Tracey, Heide, and Bell 2014) linking the well-established but hitherto separate 
notions of clustering and governance. We propose that variations in the extent of shared 
ownership of clustered outlets, and differences between franchisor- and franchisee-owned 
outlets in their relative vulnerability to intra-brand competition as well as in the 
operational leeway available to them, will likely result in differential performance 
outcomes. Ours is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, to unravel the complex 
interplay among geographic proximity, individual outlets’ evolving experience, and their 
governance.  
 
In the section that follows, we first develop the theoretical underpinnings of our 
conceptual framework and discuss the individual hypotheses linking clustering to outlet-
level sales performance, and the moderating effects of the governance context. We then 
describe the research method, results, and their implications. We conclude with the 
limitations of our study and possible future research directions. 
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Conceptual Background 
 
Figure 1 displays our proposed conceptual framework. Building on the well-established 
literature on organizational learning (Argote 2011; Darr and Kurtzberg 2000; Ho and 
Ganesan 2013; Huber 1991), we acknowledge the likely positive effects of clustering 
same-brand outlets in terms of the potential it poses for greater learning, interaction, and 
knowledge transfer due to their shared brand (Alcacer and Delgado 2016; Lu and Wedig 
2013; Tracey, Heide, and Bell 2014). We also recognize the intra-brand competitive 
effects of clustering same-brand outlets (Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012). Outlets 
clustered with one another are more likely to compete for the same set of customers, and 
therefore cannibalize sales (Davis 2006; Kalnins 2004). Our hypotheses address this 
fundamental tension and suggest when one perspective might dominate the other. A brief 
overview of each perspective follows.  
 
Knowledge Transfer Effect  
 
Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011, p.1124) define organizational learning as “…a change 
in the organization’s knowledge that occurs as a function of experience.” Such 
knowledge includes both explicit and tacit components, such as technical skills, product- 
and service process-, and local market-specific knowledge (Ho and Ganesan 2013; 
Kalnins and Mayer 2004). Acquiring knowledge is an ongoing process and might occur 
directly via the focal outlet’s operating experience and/or indirectly from other outlets’ 
experience (Argote and Miron-Spektor 2011; Bradach 1997; Shane 2005). Learning from 
others’ experience may take place through contact learning – transmission of routines 
through personal and formal relationships, as well as through mimetic learning – 
imitating or vicarious learning of routines from other outlets (e.g., through observation) 
(Baum and Ingram 1998; Miner and Haunschild 1995). 
 
To further explain the knowledge transfer effect of clustering, we rely on the well-
established motivation, opportunity, and ability (MOA) framework (Argote, McEvily, 
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and Reagans 2003; MacInnis, Moorman, and Jaworski 1991) to inform our hypotheses. 
The opportunity for knowledge transfer exists to the extent that outlets have occasion to 
share knowledge with each other. We suggest that greater clustering affords the focal 
outlet greater opportunities to seek and acquire knowledge from proximal same-brand 
outlets while allowing operators of closely located outlets to observe, meet, and share 
knowledge with one another with greater ease (Ganesan, Malter, and Rindfleisch 2005). 
Our conceptual framework, however, suggests that such opportunities may or may not be 
realized, depending on the motivation and ability of outlets to seek, transfer, and absorb 
knowledge, and the governance context – shared ownership and franchisor vs. franchisee 
ownership. We briefly outline each factor below. 
 
Motivation to seek and transfer knowledge. Motivation to seek knowledge is the extent to 
which a focal outlet is driven to learn from proximal same-brand outlets. Newly 
established focal outlets are less experienced and knowledgeable about local market 
conditions than more mature focal outlets. Therefore, ceteris paribus, we expect newly 
established focal outlets to be more motivated to seek knowledge than their more mature 
counterparts. Motivation to transfer knowledge is the extent to which proximal same-
brand outlets are willing to share their knowledge with a focal outlet. Within a franchise 
system, the franchisor is incentivized and motivated to share operational knowhow with 
its franchisees; the transfer of knowledge from franchisor-owned outlets to a franchisee-
owned focal outlet is thus likely to be free-flowing (Bradach 1997, 1998). Why might 
franchisee-owned outlets, however, be motivated to transfer their knowledge to other 
franchisee-owned outlets? Our review of the literature suggests that, although not as 
forthcoming with their knowledge as the franchisor, franchisee-owned outlets do share  
knowledge with each other even if separately owned and operated (Ingram and Simons 
2002) for at least two key reasons. First, proximally located same-brand outlets are likely 
to share similar problems and experiences associated with their local markets (Darr and 
Kurtzberg 2000). These experiences give same-brand outlets similar frames of reference 
that should ease and encourage information sharing (Huber 1991; Shrivastava and 
Schneider 1984). Second, proximally located same-brand outlets face similar competition 
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(i.e., out-groups) and therefore identify more with their in-group (i.e., same-brand outlets) 
(Bhattacharya and Sen 2003; Sherif 1966; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Such identitification 
is likely to lead to in-group members having at least moderate levels of motivation to 
transfer knowledge to other same-brand outlets.  
 
Ability to transfer and absorb knowledge. Although a necessary condition, the motivation 
to transfer knowledge is not sufficient for successful knowledge transfer. What is also 
needed is the ability to transfer and absorb knowledge. The ability to transfer knowledge 
is the extent to which proximal outlets have relevant skills and information to transfer to 
a focal outlet. The more mature an outlet, the more likely it is to have accumulated a 
greater amount of experience relative to a newer, less well-established outlet (Brittain 
1989; Huber 1991). This greater depth of experience is reflected in stronger 
organizational routines and operating procedures, and deeper repositories of knowledge 
regarding their appropriate application (Argote and Miron-Spektor 2011; Knott 2003). 
Thus, the more mature proximal outlets are, the greater their ability to transfer knowledge 
to a focal outlet.7 The ability to absorb knowledge is the extent to which a focal outlet has 
the capacity to incorporate information from proximal same-brand outlets. As the focal 
outlet gains experience, its ability to value, assimilate, and apply new knowledge – i.e., 
its absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) – also increases. With an increase in 
its absorptive capacity, the focal outlet is more likely to value and use knowledge 
available from its proximal same-brand outlets (Cuypers, Cuypers, and Martin 2016), and 
to realize higher levels of productivity (Kim 1998) and performance (Chen, Lin, and 
Chang 2009). 
 
Intra-Brand Competitive Effect 
 
Coincident with potential knowledge transfer benefits are the costs of intra-brand 
competition and the sales cannibalization they elicit. Prior research provides evidence of 
                                                          
7 We also acknowledge the possibility of diminishing returns to experience, and test for this in our 
empirical specification.  
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increased competition between closely located same-brand outlets (Kalnins 2003, 2004; 
Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012). The clustered same-brand outlets sell the same 
products and share the same set of customers in close proximity to each other with little 
product or service differentiation (Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012), and are therefore 
viewed as close substitutes by customers (Kalnins 2003). The perceived substitutability 
of same-brand outlets makes travel cost incurred by customers more salient (Davis 2006; 
Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012), resulting in the sales cannibalization of existing 
outlets (Kalnins 2004). This cannibalization reduces as the distance between outlets 
increases (Davis 2006; Kalnins 2004; Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012). Thus, 
proximally located same-brand outlets are likely to compete more fiercely than outlets 
farther away (Kaufmann and Rangan 1990). 
 
Governance Context as Moderator  
 
Our conceptual framework also identifies two relevant governance characteristics that 
help determine whether knowledge transfer or competitive effects dominate. Within the 
present context, we consider the shared ownership of the clustered outlets (i.e., multi-unit 
operations). We hypothesize shared ownership to result in a likely increased motivation 
to seek and transfer knowledge, thereby inducing a significant weakening of intra-brand 
competitive effects (Kalnins and Lafontaine 2004). Building on recent theoretical 
developments linking governance characteristics and geographic clusters (Bell, Tracey, 
and Heide 2009; Tracey, Heide, and Bell 2014), we also identify franchisor vs. franchisee 
ownership of clustered outlets as a critical “shifter” (Shane 2001) of the knowledge-
competition boundary effects. Specifically, franchisees are hypothesized to experience 
higher costs of intra-brand competition and lower benefits of knowledge transfer relative 
to their franchisor-owned counterparts. 
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Hypotheses 
 
Clustering Effects 
 
Table 2 reflects the ideas outlined in the previous section and details the underlying logic 
for Hypotheses 1A, 1B, and 2 (under “Clustering Effects on Outlet Sales”). We suggest 
that clustering provides the opportunity for a focal outlet to learn from same-brand 
proximal outlets. Thus, our arguments below rest on the motivation and ability to transfer 
and absorb knowledge,  and on the intra-brand competition between new and mature, and 
focal and proximal, outlets. We first take the perspective of the newly established focal 
outlet, followed by that of the mature focal outlet. For both new and mature focal outlets, 
we predict the impact of their clustering with other new and mature proximal same-brand 
outlets on their sales, balancing knowledge transfer and intra-brand competitive effects.  
 
The perspective of the new focal outlet. Consider the cluster types represented in Table 2, 
wherein a new (N) focal outlet i may be clustered at time t with other new (N) or mature 
(M) proximal outlets of the same brand, forming clusters CLit(NN) and CLit(NM) 
respectively. Given its relative inexperience, a newly established focal outlet is likely to 
be highly motivated to seek knowledge from proximal same-brand outlets. However, its 
proximal same-brand outlets (whether new or mature) are, at best, moderately motivated 
to transfer knowledge due to intra-brand competition with the new focal outlet. In 
addition, a newly established focal outlet has less ability (i.e., absorptive capacity) to 
absorb knowledge due to its lower accumulated experience (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). 
The clustering of a newly established focal outlet with either new proximal same-brand 
outlets (with low ability to transfer knowledge) or mature proximal same-brand outlets 
(with high ability to transfer knowledge), therefore, does not translate into a significant 
knowledge benefit.  
 
Relative to mature outlets, newly established outlets possess less knowledge of their own, 
and are less practiced and capable of performing the activities in which they are engaged 
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(Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Newly established outlets do not know local market 
conditions and competitors as well as their mature counterparts, thereby negatively 
impacting their sales performance. It is this liability of newness that makes a newly 
established focal outlet more susceptible to intra-brand competition (Freeman and Carroll 
1983). Thus, we would expect a new focal outlet to succumb to the competitive effects of 
clustering. 
 
H1A:  The greater the clustering of a new focal outlet with other same-brand 
outlets, the lower its sales performance. 
 
In addition, we argue that the intra-brand competition experienced by the new focal outlet 
is greater when the proximal same-brand outlets are mature – i.e., in CLit(NM) relative to 
the CLit(NN) cluster. Mature proximal outlets have greater market knowledge, conferring 
on them a competitive advantage over the newly established focal outlets. We therefore 
expect that, relative to clustering with other new same-brand outlets (i.e., CLit(NN)), new 
focal outlets’ sales performance will be more negative when clustered with mature 
proximal outlets (i.e., CLit(NM)). 
  
H1B:  New focal outlets clustered with mature same-brand outlets will perform 
worse than those clustered with new same-brand outlets. 
 
 
The perspective of the mature focal outlet. Now consider a scenario where a mature (M) 
focal outlet i is clustered at time t with other mature (M) or new (N) proximal outlets of 
the same brand, forming clusters CLit(MM) and CLit(MN) respectively. Given its 
accumulated experience, a mature focal outlet is likely to have less motivation (than a 
new focal outlet) to seek knowledge from proximal others; therefore, it is less relevant 
whether its proximal outlets are motivated to transfer knowledge to it. From an ability 
standpoint, however, a mature focal outlet is likely to benefit more from being clustered 
with mature, rather than new, proximal outlets. A mature focal outlet has greater 
accumulated experience and correspondingly higher absorptive capacity than its newly 
established counterparts (Zahra and George 2002). As such, it would benefit from being 
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clustered with other mature outlets of the same brand which have the ability to transfer 
knowledge due to their greater repository of relevant knowledge (Kalnins and Mayer 
2004). This knowledge benefit to the mature outlet is limited when clustered with newly 
established outlets, as newly established outlets likely possess less relevant knowledge to 
transfer (Kalnins and Mayer 2004). From a knowledge transfer perspective, the mature 
focal outlet is better served when clustered with other mature outlets rather than with 
newly established proximal outlets. 
 
However, from an intra-brand competitive threat perspective, the opposite inference is 
likely to prevail – i.e., the mature focal outlet is better served when clustered with newly 
established outlets rather than mature outlets. The reason for this inference lies in the 
greater market knowledge of the mature focal outlet, which confers a competitive 
advantage over the newly established proximal outlets. As proximal outlets’ experience 
increases, however, this knowledge-based competitive advantage dissipates, and the focal 
outlet experiences a higher level of intra-brand competition from mature proximal outlets. 
This trade-off between knowledge benefits and intra-brand competition results in our 
hypothesizing no significant difference in sales performance between mature focal outlets 
clustered with mature and new outlets.  
 
H2:  The greater clustering of a mature focal outlet with other same-brand outlets 
will neither help nor hinder its sales performance. 
 
 
Moderating Effects of Shared Ownership 
 
Our hypotheses thus far have focused on the anticipated main effects of clustering on the 
focal outlet’s sales performance. To these, we now add the potential moderating effects 
of shared ownership of the focal and proximal outlets (see Moderation Effects of Shared 
Ownership, Table 2). We define shared ownership as the extent to which outlets in the 
cluster are owned by the same operator as that of the focal outlet. For franchisee-owned 
focal outlets, this comprises only those proximal outlets owned by the same focal 
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franchisee. When the focal outlet is franchisor-owned, this comprises only the franchisor-
owned outlets within that cluster. 
 
Shared ownership affects the clustering-performance relationship in at least three ways. 
First, shared ownership creates even more opportunities for outlets to transfer knowledge 
to one another via multiple means. Indeed, Darr, Argote, and Epple (1995) note that 
outlets operating under shared ownership have more regular communication with each 
other and a greater number of interpersonal ties than those not sharing common 
ownership. Moreover, shared ownership creates more opportunities to transfer knowledge 
through contact learning (in addition to mimetic learning), in which knowledge is 
transferred through personal and formal relationships (Baum and Ingram 1998; Miner 
and Haunschild 1995). Second, shared ownership positively affects the knowledge 
transfer process by enhancing the motivation of outlets to seek and share knowledge with 
one another (Argote and Darr 2000; Darr and Kurtzberg 2000). Unlike outlets that do not 
share a common owner, outlets operating under shared ownership are likely to have 
greater norms of reciprocity, a common language system, and incentives to share 
knowledge, all of which enhance the motivation to not only seek, but also to share 
knowledge (Darr, Argote, and Epple 1995). Third, and perhaps as important, shared 
ownership of the clustered outlets weakens the intra-brand competition between the focal 
and proximal outlets (Kalnins and Lafontaine 2004). We now discuss how shared 
ownership might temper the performance implications of clustering for a newly 
established outlet and a mature outlet in turn. 
 
The perspective of the new focal outlet. Recall that, per Hypothesis 1B, we expected a 
new focal outlet clustered with mature proximal outlets to underperform relative to a new 
focal outlet clustered with newly established outlets. We attributed this to the double 
jeopardy of a new focal outlet’s inability to absorb knowledge from proximal (mature and 
new) outlets and a higher level of intra-brand competition from more mature proximal 
outlets. We expect shared ownership to significantly attenuate (i.e., weaken) both these 
adverse effects.  
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As the extent of shared ownership between a focal outlet and its proximal outlets 
increases, the motivation of the proximal outlets to transfer their knowledge to the focal 
outlet increases (Argote, McEvily, and Reagans 2003) due to the common owner’s 
objective of ensuring successful operations across her multiple outlets. Although newly 
established focal outlets are less able to value, assimilate, and apply new knowledge (i.e., 
lower absorptive capacity), shared ownership creates more opportunities to learn by 
contact rather than solely relying on mimetic learning, which can help address some of 
these limitations (Darr, Argote, and Epple 1995). Thus, when operating under shared 
ownership, newly established focal outlets have additional ways to learn organizational 
routines and operating procedures that are less available to outlets that do not share 
common ownership. 
 
Just as important, shared ownership of clustered outlets brings about a lowering of intra-
brand competition, as clustered outlets that share ownership do not perceive each other as 
competitive threats (Kalnins and Lafontaine 2004). Thus, an increase in the extent of 
shared ownership likely brings about greater knowledge gains by new focal outlets from 
mature proximal outlets. Together, this suggests: 
 
H3:  As the extent of shared ownership increases, new focal outlets that are 
clustered with mature proximal outlets will perform better than those 
clustered with new proximal outlets. 
 
The perspective of the mature focal outlet. Recall that per Hypothesis 2, a mature focal 
outlet had more (less) knowledge to gain from other mature (new) proximal outlets, but 
also faced more (less) intra-brand competition from these more (less) experienced outlets. 
The positive and adverse effects of clustering were expected to counter one another, 
resulting in no likely distinguishable performance levels. We expect shared ownership to 
change this as well.  
 
As before, shared ownership is likely to enhance the motivation of the focal outlet to seek 
knowledge from its co-owned proximal outlets, and for the latter to transfer their 
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knowledge to the focal outlet (Hinds and Pfeffer 2003). Mature focal outlets possess 
greater accumulated experience and a correspondingly higher level of absorptive capacity 
(Zahra and George 2002); as well, mature outlets possess a greater repository of available 
relevant knowledge to transfer (Kalnins and Mayer 2004). Thus, mature proximal outlets 
are likely to provide knowledge benefits to mature focal outlets that have the ability to 
absorb this knowledge. This knowledge transfer-related benefit is likely reduced when 
proximal outlets are newly established. Notwithstanding their higher motivation to 
transfer knowledge, newly established outlets have less knowledge that might benefit the 
mature focal outlet.  
 
Thanks to the dampened intra-brand competition brought about by shared ownership, 
mature focal outlets are relatively sheltered from the intra-brand competition typically 
associated with the presence of other mature outlets in their vicinity. Thus, an increase in 
the extent of shared ownership likely brings about greater knowledge gains by mature 
focal outlets from their mature proximal outlets. Together, this suggests: 
 
H4:  As the extent of shared ownership increases, mature focal outlets that are 
clustered with mature proximal outlets will perform better than those 
clustered with new proximal outlets. 
 
Moderating Effects of Franchisor vs. Franchisee Ownership 
 
We draw on the rich body of franchising research on the drivers (Brickley and Dark 
1987; Lafontaine and Shaw 2005; Perryman and Combs 2012) and consequences of 
outlet ownership (Kalnins 2004; Michael 2000; Srinivasan 2006) to posit moderation of 
the earlier hypothesized clustering effects, depending on whether the focal outlet is 
franchisor- or franchisee-owned. Relative to franchisor-owned outlets, we suggest that 
franchisee-owned outlets are more vulnerable to intra-brand competition and benefit less 
from the knowledge transfer opportunity conferred by proximal same-brand outlets. The 
resulting increased costs for franchisees and the reduced knowledge benefits to them are 
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expected to result in franchisor-owned outlets outperforming their franchisee-owned 
counterparts across the clustering scenarios we assess. We discuss the increased costs and 
reduced benefits in turn. 
 
As a consequence of higher levels of clustering-induced intra-brand competition, 
franchisees are more likely to shirk on quality inputs (Mathewson and Winter 1984) and 
to free ride on the efforts of other same-brand outlets (Rubin 1993). Relative to 
franchisee-owned outlets, franchisor-owned outlets are less likely to bear the brunt of 
intra-brand competition, as the franchisor is likely to be more strategic in ensuring that 
revenues at existing franchisor-owned outlets will not go down when new outlets are 
added (Kalnins 2004). Franchisor-owned outlets are also more likely to be subject to 
greater oversight and supervision by franchise headquarters (Brickley and Dark 1987), 
thereby reducing the incidence of shirking (Norton 1988). For these reasons, the costs 
and adverse consequences of intra-brand competition are likely lower for franchisor-
owned outlets, relative to their franchisee-owned counterparts.    
 
As well, we expect franchisees to benefit less from the proximity-conferred learning and 
knowledge-sharing opportunity than franchisor-owned outlets. Recall that the benefits of 
learning are realized when, on the basis of learning, the focal outlet undertakes different, 
improved actions and routines (Dodgson 1993; Huber 1991). Franchise systems, by their 
very design, emphasize uniformity over innovation. To ensure the former, franchisors 
rely on iron-clad contractual agreements and uniformity-ensuring constraints (Kashyap, 
Antia, and Frazier 2012) that reduce the leeway available to franchisees, relative to 
franchisor-owned outlets, to make significant changes in response to the additional 
knowhow they are able to glean from their proximal same-brand outlets. Thus, even if a 
focal franchisee has the opportunity to learn via clustering with proximal same-brand 
outlets, has proximal outlets that are motivated and have the ability to transfer knowledge 
to it, and additionally has the absorptive capacity to utilize the knowledge transferred, it 
may not be able to implement improved actions or routines due to its contractual 
constraints.  
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In essence, franchisee-owned outlets are (a) more likely to experience the prospect of a 
closely located same-brand outlet, and (b) more constrained in their ability to change 
their organizational routines and process in response to knowledge received from other 
proximal outlets. It is this double jeopardy that leads us to hypothesize that:  
 
H5:  Franchisor-owned focal outlets will outperform their franchisee-owned 
counterparts, the greater the clustering with other same-brand outlets; the 
dominance by franchisor-owned outlets will persist across new and mature 
outlets. 
 
 
Research Method 
 
Empirical Context and Data Collection Procedure 
 
We collaborated with a large US-based franchisor of automotive maintenance and repair 
services to test our hypotheses. The firm, which started operations with two outlets in 
1977, began franchising in 1988 and currently has 988 franchisor- and franchisee-owned 
outlets in 41 US states. The participating firm provided information on the date of 
establishment, specific location (street address), and the ownership of each outlet, i.e., 
franchisor- or franchisee-owned, from system inception in 1977 to its 988th outlet in 
2012. Additionally, top management shared outlet-level sales performance information 
on an annual basis from 2004 to 2012. Examining a firm with multiple outlets in a single 
sector enables us to control for sector effects (Perryman and Combs 2012) while 
providing us with a unique opportunity to examine issues related to clustering and outlet 
governance at a granular level. 
 
Supplementary data collection. We supplemented these data with various firm- and 
market-specific variables at the county level such as royalty rate, inter-brand competition, 
population, per capita income, and area from Franchise Disclosure Documents (FDDs), 
the United States Census Bureau, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Table 3 displays 
the complete list of variables used in this study and their data sources. The rich 
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information in the dataset provides us an unprecedented opportunity to compute spatial 
characteristics and link these to individual outlet performance.  
 
Unit of Analysis and Measures 
 
Our unit of analysis is the individual outlet i (i = 1,….,, 988), observed t years since its 
inception (t = 0,….., 35). Our objective is to relate the clustering of outlets to their 
corresponding sales performance over time. Table 4A provides the descriptive statistics 
for all the variables and the pairwise correlations among them; Table 4B displays the 
same information for the untransformed raw data.  
 
Sales performance. Our focal dependent variable, outlet-level sales revenue (SRit), is the 
natural log-transformed annual sales revenue realized by outlet i in year t. 
 
Cluster types. We assessed the extent to which each outlet i was part of a cluster of same-
brand outlets at time t by computing the Local Moran’s I index (Anselin 1995) using 
ArcGIS 10.3. The Local Moran’s I estimates clustering strength or spatial autocorrelation 
of a focal outlet based on two factors: 1) its geographic proximity to other outlets, and 2) 
its similarity to or dissimilarity with other outlets of the same franchise system on a 
specific attribute, in our case outlet i’s accumulated experience as inferred from its age. 
Given a set of outlet locations and the associated accumulated experience, the Local 
Moran’s I computes the extent to which an individual outlet is clustered with other 
outlets, and if so, the nature of clustering – with similar or dissimilar accumulated 
experience levels.  
 
The computation of the Local Moran’s I generates two outputs 1) the Local Moran’s I 
score along with a z-score and a p-value which provide the strength of clustering for each 
outlet, and 2) the cluster category of each significantly clustered outlet based on its 
attribute (i.e., in the present context, outlet age). The Local Moran’s I identifies outlets 
with low (i.e., younger age outlets) and high (older age outlets) attribute values by using 
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the normal distribution of outlet age, categorizing each as new and mature respectively. 
It, thus, not only allows us to infer the strength of clustering at the individual outlet level, 
but also the four archetypal cluster types of theoretical relevance based on age: CLit(NN), 
whereby a new focal outlet i is clustered with other new outlets at time t; CLit(NM) , 
indicating a new focal outlet i clustered with mature outlets at time t; CLit(MM), when a 
mature focal outlet i is clustered with other mature outlets at time t; and CLit(MN), when a 
mature focal outlet i is clustered with new outlets at time t. Prior studies in marketing 
have used Moran’s I index to measure spatial dependence of variables (e.g., Mittal, 
Kamakura, and Govind 2004; Peters, Albers, and Kumar 2008). The Appendix 3A 
provides additional details with respect to the Local Moran’s I computation, and Figure 2 
displays examples from our data of each of the four prototypical clustering types. 
 
Shared ownership. Consistent with prior research (Lu and Wedig 2013), we define 
clustering within a boundary of 25-mile radius of the focal outlet, and measure shared 
ownership of clustered outlets (SOit) as the count of proximal outlets j within this 25-mile 
radius of the focal outlet i at time t. For franchisee-owned focal outlets, this measure 
counts only those proximal outlets that are owned by the same focal franchisee (i.e., 
multi-unit franchisees). When the focal outlet is franchisor-owned, the count includes 
only franchisor-owned outlets within 25-radius of the focal outlet. 
 
Franchisor vs. franchisee ownership. We operationalize franchisor vs. franchisee 
ownership (FFOi) as a dichotomous variable which takes a value of 1 when an outlet i is 
franchisee-owned, and 0 when franchisor-owned (Dutta, Bergen, Heide, and John 1995; 
Heide 2003). 
 
Control variables. We incorporate several control variables that are expected to have an 
impact on the individual outlet’s sales performance over and above our hypothesized 
variables. We measure the cluster size (CSit) as the number of same-brand outlets within a 
25-mile radius of a focal outlet. We also include the mean age of outlets in a 25-mile 
radius of the focal outlet, incorporating its quadratic term as well to control for the 
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possibility of diminishing returns to experience. We control for franchise system size 
(FSt)  ̶  the total number of outlets in operation in year t, and royalty rate (RRt)  ̶  the 
ongoing payment as a percentage of sales that franchisees must pay the franchisor for 
their use of the trademark and other support. System size reflects overall access of the 
outlet to resources which could impact performance; royalties incentivize franchisor 
investments in the brand (Agrawal and Lal 1995), thereby boosting franchisee sales and 
making the franchise more attractive to franchisees (Shane 1998). We also control for 
market-specific effects on outlet sales performance. The most fine-grained market data 
we are able to collect is at the US county level k (k=1,…., 270). We include inter-brand 
competition (IBCkt) – the total number of outlets of other competing brands, included in 
the five-digit NAICS code corresponding to the sector in which the franchise system 
operates, located in county k in year t. We also include the population (POPkt) of county 
k in year t, the income per capita (INkt) in county k in year t, and the area of the county 
(ARk) in square miles. Finally, we control for unobserved heterogeneity by including 
year-specific fixed effects for the t years in our dataset. 
 
Model Specification 
 
Although we were able to obtain data pertaining to individual outlet locations from the 
inception of the franchise system in 1977, corresponding outlet sales data are available 
only from 2004, and are missing for some outlets. To account for potential biased 
parameter estimates due to sales data not missing at random, we correct for selection bias 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2005; Greene 2003) by specifying a Heckman selection model 
(Heckman 1976) in the first stage of the analysis and including the lambda vector thus 
obtained in the second stage. This second-stage (substantive) equation investigates the 
interplay of clustering, shared ownership, franchisor- versus franchisee-ownership of the 
focal outlet, and their impact on outlet sales performance while accounting for potential 
endogeneity of the regressors. 
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Stage 1: Correction for sample selection bias. We specify our selection equation as a 
probit model as follows:  
 
(1)                    𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐿𝑈𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐹𝐸𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑞
10
𝑞=3 𝑌𝑅𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where, 
INCLUDEit = Outlet i’s availability of sales information at time t,  
OAit         = Age of Outlet i at time t,   
FEi         = Franchisee-Owned as a binary variable (franchisee-owned = 1, and 0 
otherwise), 
YRt         = Specific Years as dummy variables with 2004 as the excluded base year,  
and εit ~ N(μ1, σ2) 
From equation (1) above, we obtain and store the Inverse Mills Ratio (i.e., Lambda) 
vector for subsequent inclusion in the second stage of analysis. 
 
Stage 2: Substantive equation estimation. In the second stage, we relate each outlet’s 
clustering, shared ownership, and franchisor vs. franchisee ownership to its annual sales 
performance. Our model specification approach in this stage is informed by the need to 
account for the potential endogeneity of regressors – clustering (CLit(NN), CLit(NM), 
CLit(MM), CLit(MN)), shared ownership (SOit), and franchisor vs. franchisee ownership 
(FFOi). The clustering-related regressors and shared ownership are time-varying, 
whereas franchisor vs. franchisee ownership is time-invariant. Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests 
of these variables yielded significant evidence of endogeneity. We therefore specified an 
endogeneity-correcting regression equation. We treat the interactions of clustering with 
shared ownership and with franchisor vs. franchisee ownership as endogenous, since 
interaction terms of endogenous regressors are also endogenous (Wooldridge 2010).   
 
We use the Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variables (henceforth, HTIV) regression 
approach to account for endogenous regressors. Several prior research studies in 
marketing have used the HTIV model to account for the endogeneity of time-varying and 
time-invariant regressors (e.g., Boulding and Christen 2003, 2008; Germann, Ebbes, and 
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Grewal 2015; Jacobson 1990. See Appendix 3B for estimation details and checks of its 
appropriateness). We specify our HTIV model as follows (variables in bold font denote 
endogenous regressors, of which governance (GOVi) is time invariant): 
 
(2)      SRit = η0 + η1 CLit(NN) + η2 CLit(NM) + η3 CLit(MM) + η4 CLit(MN) + η5 SOit + η6 FFOi 
                          + η7 CLit(NN)* SOit + η8 CLit(NM) * SOit + η9 CLit(MM) * SOit + η10 CLit(MN) * SOit   
                          + η11 CLit(NM)* FFOi + η12 CLit(MM) * FFOi + η13 CLit(MN) * FFOi + η14 CSit  
                          + η15 APit + η16 (APit)2 + η17 FSt + η18 RRt +η19 IBCkt + η20 POPkt + η21 INkt  
                          + η22 ARk + η23 IMRit + ∑ 𝜂31𝑟=24 r YRt + αi + uit   
 
Where, 
SRit  = Outlet Sales Revenue (natural log-transformed),  
CLit(NN) = Clustering of a new focal outlet with other new outlets, 
CLit(NM) = Clustering of a new focal outlet with mature outlets, 
CLit(MM) = Clustering of a mature focal outlet with other mature outlets,  
CLit(MN) = Clustering of a mature focal outlet with new outlets, 
SOit = Shared ownership of clustered outlets, 
FFOi = Ownership of a focal outlet i (franchisee-owned = 1, franchisor-owned = 0), 
CSit = Cluster Size, 
APit   = Mean Age of Clustered Outlets, 
(APit)
2   = Quadratic Term for Mean Age of Clustered Outlets, 
FSt   = Firm Size, 
RRt   = Royalty Rate, 
IBCkt   = Inter-brand Competition, 
POPkt   = Market Population (natural log-transformed), 
INkt   = Income per capita (natural log-transformed), 
ARk   = Market Area (natural log-transformed), 
YRt   = Year,  
IMRit    = Inverse Mills Ratio, 
αi ~ iid (µ2, σα2), and uit ~ iid (µ3, σe2). 
 
Note that over the period 2004 through 2012, there are no observed instances of 
clustering of new franchisor-owned outlets with other new outlets. As such, the impact of 
franchisee-owned new outlets clustering with other new outlets may be inferred by 
reference to the main effect of CLit(NN) in Eq (2) above. 
Results 
 
Model-free evidence. Per Table 4A, the clustering of a new focal outlet with other outlets 
is significantly and negatively correlated with outlet sales (r(CLit(NN)) = -.05; r(CLit(NM)) = 
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-.04, both p < .01), as we expected. In comparison, the clustering of mature outlets is 
significantly and positively correlated with outlets when proximal outlets are mature 
((r(CLit(MM)) = .10, p < .01), and negatively correlated when proximal outlets are new 
((r(CLit(MN)) = -.04, p < .01). Clearly, the clustering of new focal outlets is associated with 
less favorable sales performance than the clustering of mature focal outlets. Thus, these 
results provide initial model-free evidence for our baseline hypotheses H1 and H2. 
 
The Heckman selection model. The overall model is significant (Wald χ2 = 10.58, p < 
.01), and we find clear evidence of selection with respect to sales information availability 
(λ = -1.15, p < .01). We find that mature outlets (β1 = .05, p < .01) are more likely to 
provide sales information, whereas franchisee-owned outlets (β2 = -.24, p < .01) are less 
likely to provide sales information relative to franchisor-owned outlets. We also find that 
relative to the base year of 2004, there is greater availability of outlet sales information in 
subsequent years.  
 
The HTIV estimation. Table 5 displays the results of the HTIV estimation. The overall 
model is significant (Wald χ2 = 11,096.91, p < .01), suggesting that the hypothesized 
predictors of outlet-level sales performance have significant explanatory power. The 
main effect of clustering on the focal outlets’ sales performance is significant and 
negative when new focal outlets are clustered with new proximal outlets (η1 = -.03, p < 
.01), and with mature proximal outlets (η2 = -.10; p < .05) of the same brand. We 
therefore find support for hypothesis H1A. However, there were no significant sales 
performance differences between new focal outlets being clustered with new or mature 
proximal outlets of the same brand (χ2 = 2.49, n.s.); hypothesis H1B is therefore not 
supported. As hypothesized, we find no impact of clustering of mature focal outlets with 
other mature (η3 = .01; n.s.) or new outlets (η4 = .04; n.s.) on the focal outlets’ sales 
performance. We thus find support for hypothesis H2. 
 
We also find support for Hypothesis H3, which predicted that new focal outlets perform 
better when clustered with mature (η8 = .01, p < .05) rather than new (η7 = -.01, p < .01) 
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proximal outlets that are under shared ownership. Per H4, as the extent of shared 
ownership increases, mature focal outlets gain sales when clustered with mature proximal 
outlets (η9 = .00, p < .01), and lose sales when clustered with new proximal outlets (η10 = 
-.02, p < .01). Thus, hypothesis H4 is supported.   
 
Hypothesis H5 predicted that franchisee-owned outlets would gain less from clustering 
relative to franchisor-owned outlets. We find partial support for this hypothesis. 
Specifically, we find that mature franchisee-owned outlets achieve lower sales than their 
franchisor-owned counterparts, when in close proximity to other mature outlets (η12 = -
.07, p < .01), which is in line with hypothesis H5. Relative to their franchisor-owned 
counterparts, the clustering of new franchisee-owned outlets with mature outlets results in 
significant gains to sales performance (η11 = .09, p < .05). This runs counter to hypothesis 
H5. Furthermore, we find that the clustering of mature franchisees outlets with new 
outlets does not significantly differ relative to their franchisor-owned counterparts (η13 = 
-.14, n.s.). Finally, the franchise system had no instances of new franchisor-owned outlets 
clustering with other new outlets: the lack of a contrast precludes the ability to test their 
relationship. Overall, franchisor vs. franchisee ownership is found to significantly affect 
the clustering-performance relationship for both new and mature focal outlets. 
 
With respect to control variables, we find that firm size (η17 = .00, p < .01) significantly 
and positively affects outlet-level sales. Cluster size (η14 = -.10, p < .01) and royalty rate 
(η18 = -.39, p < .01), however, have a significant and negative relationship with outlet-
level sales. The mean age of cluster (η15 = -.06, p < .01) is significantly and negatively 
associated with outlet sales but with a marginally significant diminishing trend (η16 = .00, 
p < .10). For market-specific control variables, greater population (η20 = .20, p < .01) and 
per capita income (η21 = 1.04, p < .01) significantly and positively increase outlet-level 
sales, whereas inter-brand competition (η19 = .00, p < .10) partially and positively affects 
outlet-level sales. Market area (η22 = -.05, n.s.) does not significantly affect outlet-level 
sales. Finally, we find significant year-specific effects on outlet-level sales. 
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Post hoc Analysis of Significant Interactions 
 
For a better understanding of the moderating impact of shared ownership and franchisor 
vs. franchisee ownership on clustering and outlet-level sales relationship, we conducted 
an analysis of simple slopes for all significant interactions (Aiken and West 1991; 
Dawson 2014; DeCoster and Leistico 2007). Table 6 displays the results corresponding to 
the significant two-way interactions.  
 
An examination of Figure 3A (Panel 1 & 2) suggests that new focal outlets’ sales are not 
significantly affected by their clustering with mature proximal outlets under the shared 
ownership (the simple slope of CLit(NM) for franchisor-owned focal outlets = .08, n.s.). 
New focal outlets, however, lose more sales when clustered with other new outlets under 
the shared ownership (the simple slope of CLit(NN) for franchisor-owned focal outlets = -
.20, p < .01). Figure 3A (Panel 3 & 4) suggests that mature focal outlets gain sales when 
clustered with other mature outlets in the presence of shared ownership (the simple slope 
of CLit(MM) for franchisor-owned focal outlets = .12, p < .01). Mature focal outlets’ sales 
performance, however, is harmed when clustered with new outlets under the shared 
ownership (the simple slope of CLit(NN) for franchisor-owned focal outlets = -.67, p < 
.01). 
 
Figure 3B (Panel 1) suggests that clustering of a new focal outlet with mature outlets 
harms outlet-level sales when the focal outlet is franchisor-owned (the simple slope of 
CLit(NM) for franchisor-owned focal outlets = -.10, p < .05). Relative to franchisor-owned 
new focal outlets, franchisee-owned new focal outlets are not significantly hurt or helped 
by their proximity to mature outlets (the simple slope of CLit(NM) for franchisee-owned 
focal outlets = -.01, n.s.). Figure 3B (Panel 2) suggests that mature franchisor-owned 
focal outlets’ clustering with other mature outlets has no significant impact on their sales 
performance (the simple slope of CLit(MM) for franchisee-owned focal outlets = .01, n.s.). 
It is only franchisee-owned mature focal outlets that lose from greater clustering with 
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other mature outlets (the simple slope of CLit(MM) for franchisee-owned focal outlets = -
.06, p < .05). 
 
Alternate Specifications  
 
We assessed the stability of our findings to alternate estimation approaches, alternate 
measures of performance, alternative explanations for the effects reported, alternate time-
related specifications, and alternative levels of analysis. 
 
Alternate estimator. In order to test the robustness of our results, we used the fixed-
effects approach as an alternate estimator. The FE estimation results in the dropping of 
the time-invariant franchisor vs. franchisee ownership (FFOi) variable, but retains all four 
archetypal clustering types and their interactions with shared ownership and franchisor 
vs. franchisee ownership. All results with respect to the hypothesized effects remain 
robust. 
 
Alternate measure of performance. We also relied on a different but related measure of 
outlet performance – sales transaction volume, which we operationalized as the total 
number of transactions reported by each outlet per year. Our HTIV estimates remain 
robust to this alternate measure of performance as well. 
 
Alternative explanation for the effects reported. We also explored the possibility that the 
focal outlet’s sales might be impacted not because of any knowledge transfer pursuant to 
clustering, but rather by better franchisor monitoring capabilities as a function of nearby 
franchisor-owned outlets. So as to test this alternative explanation, we computed the 
number of franchisor-owned outlets in the county of location of the focal outlet, and 
included this variable in our model. All the clustering-related effects and their 
interactions with shared ownership and franchisor vs. franchisee ownership remain 
robust, and the main effect of the additional regressor is non-significant. 
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Alternate temporal separation. Our conceptualization and subsequent model specification 
approach have proceeded on the assumption of contemporaneous (immediate, within the 
same year) effects of clustering on the sales performance of each outlet. We also assessed 
one- and two-year lagged models of the hypothesized relationships. Our principal 
findings of baseline hypotheses, and that of moderating effects of shared ownership and 
franchisor vs. franchisee ownership, persist.  
 
Alternate level of analysis. Prior research has mostly used clustering as a global or 
system-wide construct (within the present context, across all 988 outlets of the franchise 
system) without investigating the type of clustering or with whom a focal outlet is 
clustered. We therefore specified an alternate model, measuring clustering at the system-
level and treating it as an endogenous regressor. The HTIV estimation results show that 
the system-wide clustering of outlets is positively and significantly associated with the 
individual outlets’ sales. This is consistent with prior research which does not pay heed to 
the accumulated experience, shared ownership, and franchisor vs. franchisee ownership 
of the clustered outlets (see, for example, Lu and Wedig 2013). This result, however, 
masks the nuances that emerge from a fuller consideration of the specific identities of the 
focal and proximal outlets, and provides a misleading confidence in clustering effects on 
performance. 
 
Discussion 
 
Proximity is a contentious issue for all franchising participants. Yet, it is a particular 
irritant for franchisees due to sales cannibalization concerns. Although much has been 
made of the positive effects of clustering, our own assessment of its impact suggests that 
concerns regarding the proximity of other same-brand outlets are well placed. Our 
contention that physical distance is not the sole determinant of outlet sales finds support. 
We discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of our findings in turn. 
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Theoretical Implications 
 
The present research is motivated by the conflicting findings and assertions about the 
effects of clustering. It is important to note that disagreements with respect to clustering-
attributable performance exist not only across but also within paradigms. Consider, for 
example, how much at odds the studies reporting positive effects of agglomeration 
(Chung and Kalnins 2001) are with those warning of significant sales cannibalization 
(Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012). A similar schism is observed even for those adopting 
a sociology-informed clustering viewpoint and the knowledge transfer this implies. 
Whereas Lu and Wedig (2013) report positive performance effects, Ingram and Baum 
(1997) find evidence of a negative impact of clustering. 
Our study builds on and significantly extends both streams of work. We further unpack 
the knowledge transfer paradigm, even while acknowledging the possibility of proximity-
induced intra-brand competition. In particular, we call for a more nuanced consideration 
of clustering’s impact – one that emphasizes not just physical distance, but physical 
distance from whom. In contrast to prior assessments of clustering’s performance-related 
consequences, we posit and find strong evidence in support of the notion that the 
association between proximity and performance is not direct nor strictly positive. Rather, 
outlet performance may be helped or hindered by clustering with other same-brand 
outlets, depending on the motivation of the proximal outlets to transfer their knowledge 
to the focal outlet and the latter’s ability to absorb such knowledge. We provide evidence 
consistent with the notion that whereas motivation to transfer knowledge to the focal 
outlet increases with shared ownership, the ability to absorb this knowledge varies with 
the age and consequent operating experience of the focal outlet.       
   
This insight leads naturally to the next theoretical implication − that the specific identities 
of the focal outlet and of the same-brand outlets it may cluster with matter. Once it is 
acknowledged (a) that the impact of clustering might vary by outlets comprising the 
cluster, and (b) that in addition to physical distance, experience gained (whether own or 
through the experience of others) matters, it becomes possible to discern and explain 
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variations in performance for different outlets within the cluster. It is worth noting that 
until now, research on clustering has focused exclusively on system-level clustering; in 
the present context, this amounts to a single “clustering score” representing the extent of 
clustering across all 988 outlets of the franchise system we assessed.  As we have 
demonstrated previously, such an aggregative approach does indeed yield a positive 
association between clustering and sales. It is only when clustering is unpacked, that is, 
an individual outlet’s extent of clustering with other same-brand outlets is considered, 
that we see evidence of positive and negative cluster-attributable effects. Our research 
calls for a more subtle, disaggregated approach to assessing clustering’s impact.    
 
A third important theoretical implication pertains to the critical role of at least two facets 
of the governance context, and their interplay with proximity. We find shared ownership 
to be a critical “shifter” (Shane 2001) of the motivation for knowledge transfer among 
proximal same-brand outlets. When the focal outlet and its proximal same-brand outlets 
share ownership (whether they be franchisees operating under the same multi-unit 
franchisee, or franchisor-owned outlets clustered proximally), intra-brand competition is 
reduced. Importantly, we also find the juxtaposition of both governance and proximity, 
alluded to and emphasized by Heide and his colleagues, to have significant performance 
implications. Marrying insights from the well-known agency problem that franchising is 
subject to (Galini and Lutz 1992; Lafontaine 1992; Lal 1990) with the literature on 
knowledge transfer (Argote 2011), we hypothesize and find evidence consistent with the 
notion that franchisor vs. franchisee ownership serves to temper the effects of clustering. 
Franchisees are seen to realize reduced gains and increased costs relative to their 
franchisor partners. This finding is central to explaining and reconciling the significantly 
diverging contentions of each party with respect to proximity referred to in the opening 
quotations of this research effort. 
 
All in all, the present study emphasizes that the impact of clustering for each franchise 
system participant is not at all straightforward. Rather, it varies, depending on the 
motivation of the proximal outlets to transfer their knowledge to the focal outlet and the 
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ability of the focal outlet to absorb this knowledge and act on it. The governance context, 
as reflected in shared ownership of the clustered outlets, does appear to significantly 
temper (strengthen) the motivation of proximal outlets to transfer their knowledge; as 
well, franchisee ownership is found to be associated with mixed results – whereas mature 
franchisee-owned outlets experience reduced sales in proximity to other mature outlets, 
their newly established counterparts do not. Together, our findings suggest a far more 
nuanced interplay of proximity, its knowledge transfer possibilities, and the potential for 
intra-brand competition. 
 
Managerial Implications 
 
For franchisees. Our post hoc calculations suggest that, relative to franchisor-owned 
outlets, a new franchisee-owned outlet may expect to gain 9.5 per cent of mean annual 
sales or just over $39,000 when clustered with mature same-brand outlets8. Although the 
preceding result runs counter to our expectation, one explanation for this might lie in new 
franchisees’ increased motivation to gain as much as possible from the experience gained 
and knowledge shared by clustered mature outlets. Relative to franchisor-owned outlets, 
mature franchisee-owned outlets lose mean annual sales of 6.7 per cent (just over 
$27,000) when clustered with other mature outlets of the same brand. All in all, our 
results imply that franchisees opening new outlets closer to mature outlets of the same 
brand are likely to realize significant sales performance gains. In contrast, ceteris 
paribus, mature franchisees clustered with other mature same-brand outlets find 
themselves facing the prospect of intra-brand competition.  
 
For franchisors. Similar to franchisees, franchisor-owned outlets also experience a mixed 
bag for their clustering with other same-brand outlets. A new franchisor-owned focal 
outlet loses nearly 10 per cent or just over $39,000 in mean annual sales when clustered 
with mature outlets. When new franchisor-owned outlets are clustered with other new 
                                                          
8 These estimates and those that follow are based on the current sample; no claim is made regarding their 
generalizability.  
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outlets, the loss in sales is not nearly as bad – these outlets lose on average just over 3 per 
cent of their mean annual sales or close to $12,500. We also find that mature franchisor-
owned outlets remain relatively unaffected by outlet clustering, regardless whether the 
cluster comprises new or mature proximal outlets. Taken together, the pattern of results 
suggests that franchisors mindful of the sales performance of the outlets owned by them 
would be well advised to avoid establishing these outlets in proximity to other same-
brand outlets, whether mature or new.   
 
Across both franchisor- and franchisee-owned outlets, shared ownership of the focal and 
proximal outlets does appear to help facilitate knowledge transfer and blunt intra-brand 
competition. Under shared ownership, newly established outlets clustered with mature 
proximal outlets outperform their counterparts clustered with new proximal outlets by 
nearly 1 per cent of mean annual sales or just under $5,000. For mature outlets, the 
difference is even more striking – mature outlets clustered with other mature proximal 
outlets outperform their counterparts clustered with new proximal outlets by nearly 3 per 
cent of mean annual sales or just under $11,500. Given the average multi-unit owning 
entity (whether franchisor or multi-unit franchisee) in this franchise system owns 21 
outlets, the sales performance gains accruing from shared ownership are certainly 
significant. 
 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 
As with any research effort, our own study has limitations that we hope will form the 
basis for future research. First, although we were able to track the sales performance of 
each outlet in the franchise system over an extended period of time, we were able to do 
only from 2004. Future research that includes information on the evolution of sales 
performance over the entire life-cycle of the franchise system and/or its individual outlets 
would provide much needed additional insights with respect to proximity and its 
performance consequences for early- versus late-in-the-lifecycle franchise systems.  
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Second, our reliance on archival data over nearly a decade, while a significant strength of 
our research effort because of the longitudinal insights it affords, also limits our ability to 
directly observe (or solicit survey responses regarding) the preceding variables directly. 
Instead, we rely on proxy variables on the assumption that the relationship between the 
proxy and the concept to be measured is reasonable (Lafontaine 1992). Additional efforts 
to integrate archival with micro (survey-based, for example) data would add significant 
value, in our opinion.  
 
Finally, we analyze and report results on the evolution of a single franchise system only. 
My results are therefore specific to this sample. Future efforts that include multiple firms 
from diverse industries would help extend our findings by considering multiple franchise 
system outlets and their competitive and cooperative interactions over time. 
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TABLE 1 
SELECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE IMPACT OF PROXIMITY 
Study Context 
Knowledge Transfer 
vs. Intra-brand 
Competition 
Considered 
Governance-
Induced 
Effects 
Considered 
Outlet-Level 
Clustering 
Considered 
Location’s 
Financial 
Performance 
Considered 
Key Findings 
Ingram and Baum 
(1997) 
Hotels in Manhattan Knowledge transfer No No No 
Chain-affiliated hotels are less likely to 
survive when the chain operated more 
units there. 
Kalnins and 
Mayer (2004) 
Pizza restaurants in 
Texas 
Knowledge transfer Yes No No 
Multiunit owners benefit from local 
congenital experience.  
Lu and Wedig 
2013 
For-profit nursing 
home chains in the 
US 
Other (Monitoring cost) No Yes No 
Clustered nursing homes achieve higher 
quality due to close monitoring. 
Brickley and 
Dark (1987) 
Franchise 
companies in 
multiple industries 
in the US 
Other (Monitoring cost) Yes No No 
Company-owned units are located closer to 
monitoring headquarters.  
Kalnins (2004) 
Franchised and 
company-owned 
lodging 
establishments in 
Texas 
Intra-brand competition Yes No Yes 
New same-brand franchised outlets 
cannibalize the incumbents' revenues.  
Ganesan, Malter, 
and Rindfleisch 
(2005) 
Firms in the U.S. 
optics industry 
Knowledge transfer No No No 
Firms located in close proximity engage in 
increased face-to-face communication, but 
this has little effect on acquiring new 
product enhancing knowledge. 
Pancras, Sriram, 
and Kumar 
(2012) 
A franchised chain 
of fast food 
restaurants in a 
large US 
metropolitan area 
Intra-brand competition No No Yes 
Sales cannibalization increases as the 
distance between stores decreases. 
Perryman and 
Combs (2012) 
Fast-food/quick-
service 
establishments in 
Florida 
Other 
(Monitoring cost) 
Yes No No 
Multi-outlet franchising is cost efficient.  
 
This Study 
 
A large US based 
automotive service 
franchise system 
Both Yes Yes Yes 
The impact of clustering of same-brand 
outlets on their sales is contingent on 
outlets’ experience and the governance 
context. 
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TABLE 2 
THE LOGIC OF HYPOTHESES 
 
Cluster 
Type 
Outlet 
Type 
Motivation 
to seek 
knowledge 
Ability to 
absorb 
knowledge 
Knowledge 
Benefit to the 
Focal Outlet 
Intra-Brand 
Competition 
Faced by the 
Focal Outlet 
Specific 
Hypothesis Motivation 
to transfer 
knowledge 
Ability to 
transfer 
knowledge 
Clustering Effects on Outlet Sales 
CLit(NN) 
Focal High Low 
Low High 
H1A, H1B  
Proximals Moderate Low 
CLit(NM) 
Focal High Low 
Low Higher 
Proximals Moderate High 
CLit(MM) 
Focal Low High 
High High 
 H2 
Proximals Moderate High 
CLit(MN) 
Focal Low High 
Low Low 
Proximals Moderate Low 
Moderation Effects of Shared Ownership 
CLit(NN) 
Focal High Low 
Low Low 
H3 
Proximals High Low 
CLit(NM) 
Focal High Low 
Moderate Low 
Proximals High High 
CLit(MM) 
Focal High High 
High Low 
H4 
Proximals High High 
CLit(MN) 
Focal High High 
Low Low 
Proximals High Low 
 
Note: Subscripts “N” and “M” denote new and mature outlets. The first letter always 
represents the focal outlet, whereas the second one always represents proximal outlets. 
For example, CLNM cluster type indicates a new focal outlet that is clustered with mature 
proximal outlets of the same brand. 
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TABLE 3 
VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
 
 
Construct 
 
Measured Variable Notation Data Source 
Clustering  
Proximity of a new focal outlet i with other 
same-brand new outlets j in year t 
CLit(NN) 
Computed using ArcGIS 10.3 
Proximity of a new focal outlet i with same-
brand mature outlets j in year t 
CLit(NM) 
Proximity of a mature focal outlet i with 
other same-brand mature outlets j in year t 
CLit(MM) 
Proximity of a mature focal outlet i with 
same-brand new outlets j in year t 
CLit(MN) 
Shared Ownership  
Shared ownership of a focal outlet i with 
other same-brand outlets j within a cluster 
in year t  
SOit 
Franchisor vs. 
Franchisee Ownership 
Dichotomous variable which equals 1 when 
a focal outlet i is franchisee-owned and 0 if 
franchisor-owned 
FFOi 
Internal Company Records 
Sales Performance Sales revenue of a focal outlet i in year t SRit 
 
Control Variables 
 
Cluster Size 
Number of outlets within 25-mile radius of 
a focal outlet i in year t 
CSit Computed using ArcGIS 10.3 
Mean Age of 
Clustered Outlets 
Mean age of proximal outlets within 25-
mile radius of a focal outlet i in year t 
APit 
Internal Company Records 
Firm Size Total number of outlets in year t FSt 
Royalty Rate 
The ongoing payment as a percentage of 
sales in year t 
RRt Franchise Disclosure Documents 
Inter-brand 
Competition 
Number of outlets of competitor brands 
located in county k in year t 
IBCkt 
US Census Bureau 
Area (square miles) Area of county k  ARk 
Population (millions) Population of county k in year t POPkt Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) Income (millions) Income per capita of county k in year t INkt 
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TABLE 4A 
CORRELATION MATRIX AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Outlet Sales Revenuea SRit -                
2 Clustering (new-new) CLit(NN) -0.05 -               
3 Clustering (new-mature) CLit(NM) -0.04 -0.07 -              
4 Clustering (mature-mature) CLit(MM) 0.10 -0.16 -0.07 -             
5 Clustering (mature-new) CLit(MN) -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -            
6 Shared Ownership SOit 0.07 0.02 -0.06 0.35 -0.02 -           
7 Franchisor vs Franchisee Ownership FFOi -0.11 0.27 -0.07 -0.54 0.03 -0.35 -          
8 Cluster Size CSit 0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.31 0.00 0.89 -0.31 -         
9 Mean Age of Clustered Outlets APit 0.24 -0.51 0.15 0.52 -0.03 0.30 -0.63 0.31 -        
10 Firm Size FSt 0.32 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.22 -       
11 Royalty Rate RRt 0.13 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.22 0.72 -      
12 Inter-Brand Competition IBCkt -0.08 0.21 -0.02 -0.07 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.17 -0.07 0.06 0.07 -     
13 Market Populationa POPkt 0.04 0.13 -0.04 0.03 0.05 0.41 0.07 0.42 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.68 -    
14 Income per capitaa INkt 0.17 0.20 -0.02 0.03 0.05 0.34 0.08 0.38 0.01 0.29 0.23 0.17 0.42 -   
15 Market Areaa ARk -0.07 0.10 -0.05 -0.10 0.02 -0.15 0.24 -0.15 -0.04 0.05 0.06 0.45 0.32 -0.08 - 
  Mean   12.92 0.75 0.12 1.21 0.01 8.07 0.59 9.26 9.16 817.9 8.42 65.71 1.08 10.03 3.14 
  SD   0.87 1.89 0.67 2.89 0.21 6.84 0.49 7.82 5.58 87.45 0.49 112.6 9.75 11.49 9.91 
 
n1= 12,909 
Correlations exceeding |.02| are significant at p < .05, two-tailed 
a: Natural log-transformed 
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TABLE 4B 
CORRELATION MATRIX AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (RAW VALUES) 
 
 
n1= 12,909 
Correlations exceeding |.02| are significant at p < .05, two-tailed 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Outlet Sales Revenue SRit -               
2 Clustering (new-new) CLit(NN) 0.03 -              
3 Clustering (new-mature) CLit(NM) -0.03 -0.07 -             
4 Clustering (mature-mature) CLit(MM) 0.07 -0.16 -0.07 -            
5 Clustering (mature-new) CLit(MN) -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -           
6 Shared Ownership SOit 0.08 0.02 -0.06 0.35 -0.02 -          
7 Franchisor vs Franchisee Ownership FFOi -0.08 0.27 -0.07 -0.54 0.03 -0.35 -         
8 Cluster Size CSit 0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.31 0.00 0.89 -0.31 -        
9 Mean Age of Clustered Outlets APit 0.19 -0.51 0.15 0.52 -0.03 0.30 -0.63 0.31 -       
10 Firm Size FSt 0.33 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.22 -      
11 Royalty Rate RRt 0.15 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.22 0.72 -     
12 Inter-Brand Competition IBCkt -0.08 0.21 -0.02 -0.07 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.17 -0.07 0.06 0.07 -    
13 Market Population POPkt -0.06 0.21 -0.02 -0.05 0.11 0.19 0.13 0.20 -0.03 0.07 0.09 0.99 -   
14 Income per capita INkt 0.25 0.23 -0.02 0.01 0.05 0.31 0.09 0.34 -0.02 0.27 0.21 0.15 0.18 -  
15 Market Area ARk -0.09 0.16 -0.03 -0.09 0.04 -0.07 0.19 -0.08 -0.07 0.07 0.09 0.39 0.38 -0.10 - 
 Mean  522614 0.75 0.12 1.21 0.01 8.07 0.59 9.26 9.16 817.86 8.42 65.71 756475 42350 1420.3 
 SD  306703 1.89 0.67 2.89 0.21 6.84 0.49 7.82 5.58 87.45 0.49 112.57 1210491 10249 23.20 
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TABLE 5 
HAUSMAN-TAYLOR INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE (HTIV)  
REGRESSION ESTIMATES 
 
Outlet Sales Revenuea  
 
Hs Coeff. 
Standard  
Error 
z value 
Intercept  η0  1.69  1.45 1.17 
Clustering (new-new) CLit(NN) η1 H1A,1B -.03**    .01 -3.06 
Clustering (new-mature) CLit(NM) η2 H1A,1B -.10*  .04    -2.35 
Clustering (mature-mature) CLit(MM) η3 H2 .01  .02 .52 
Clustering (mature-new) CLit(MN) η4 H2 .04  .12        .38 
Shared Ownership SOit η5  .04**  .01 4.80 
Franchisee Ownership FFOi η6  -.80**  .15 -5.33 
Clustering (new-new) * Shared Ownership CLit(NN) * SOit  η7 H3 -.01** .00 -4.84 
Clustering (new-mature) * Shared Ownership CLit(NM) * SOit η8 H3 .01*  .00  1.99 
Clustering (mature-mature) * Shared Ownership CLit(MM) * SOit η9 H4 .00**  .00  4.09 
Clustering (mature-new) * Shared Ownership CLit(MN) * SOit η10 H4 -.02**     .01  -4.00 
Clustering (new-mature) * Franchisee Ownership CLit(NM) * FFOi η11 H5 .09* .04 2.23 
Clustering (mature-mature) * Franchisee Ownership CLit(MM) * FFOi  η12 H5 -.07**  .02  -2.86 
Clustering (mature-new) * Franchisee Ownership CLit(MN) * FFOi η13 H5 -.14 .12 -1.20 
Cluster Size CSit η14  -.10**  .01  -13.40 
Mean Age of Clustered Outlets APit η15  -.06** .01 -6.20 
Change in Mean Age of Clustered Outlets (APit)2 η16  .00+ .00 1.79 
Firm Size FSt η17  .00**  .00     7.37 
Royalty Rate RRt η18  -.39**  .05   -7.90 
Inter-brand Competition IBCkt η19  .00+  .00      1.70 
Market Populationa POPkt η20  .20**  .05  3.95 
Income per capitaa INkt η21  1.04**  .14     7.41 
Market Areaa  ARk η22  -.05  .06    -0.84 
Inverse Mills Ratio IMRit η23  -.78** .08 -10.25 
Year Fixed Effects YRt η24-31  Yes 
 
Number of Observations = n2 = 6,576;   Wald χ2 = 11,096.91 (p < .01) 
Base Year = 2004 
a: Natural log-transformed  
 
+p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, two-tailed tests. 
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TABLE 6 
SIMPLE SLOPES ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT INTERACTIONS 
 
 
 
 
Estimated Impact on 
Outlet-Level Sales 
(Simple Slope) 
t-value p-value 
Impact of clustering of the new focal outlet with other new outlets on outlet sales under shared ownership 
 
Shared Ownership (Low) 
 
-.03 -3.06 .00 
 
Shared Ownership (High) 
 
-.20 -7.04 .00 
Impact of clustering of the new focal outlet with mature outlets on outlet sales under shared ownership 
 
Shared Ownership (Low) 
 
-.10 -2.35 .02 
 
Shared Ownership (High) 
 
.08 1.25 .21 
 
Impact of clustering of the mature focal outlet with other mature outlets on outlet sales under shared ownership 
 
 
Shared Ownership (Low) 
 
.01 .52 .60 
 
Shared Ownership (High) 
 
.12 6.64 .00 
Impact of clustering of the mature focal outlet with new outlets on outlet sales under shared ownership 
 
Shared Ownership (Low) 
 
.04 .38 .71 
 
Shared Ownership (High) 
 
-.67 -3.22 .00 
Impact of clustering of the new focal outlet with mature outlets on outlet sales with respect to franchisor vs. 
franchisee ownership 
 
Franchisor vs. Franchisee Ownership (Franchisor-Owned) 
 
-.10 -2.35 .02 
 
Franchisor vs. Franchisee Ownership (Franchisee-Owned) 
 
-.01 -.33 .74 
Impact of clustering of the mature focal outlet with other mature outlets on outlet sales with respect to franchisor 
vs. franchisee ownership 
 
Franchisor vs. Franchisee Ownership (Franchisor-Owned) 
 
.01 .52 .60 
 
Franchisor vs. Franchisee Ownership (Franchisee-Owned) 
 
-.06 -2.40 .02 
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FIGURE 1 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
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Outlet Performance 
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• Firm Size 
• Royalty Rate 
• Inter-brand Competition 
• Market Population 
• Income per capita 
• Market Area 
• Year 
Shared Ownership  
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FIGURE 2 
CLUSTERING OF OUTLETS IN YEAR 2012 
 
 
                                                                 
 
      
 
 
                                         Mature Outlet                                   New Outlet 
 
 
Clustering of new focal outlets with 
other new outlets (Michigan) Clustering of mature focal outlets 
with other mature outlets (Ohio) 
Clustering of a mature focal outlet 
with new outlets (California) 
Clustering of a new focal outlet with 
mature outlets (Tennessee) 
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FIGURE 3A 
SIMPLE SLOPES ANALYSIS FOR SIGNIFICANT INTERACTIONS 
(SHARED OWNERSHIP) 
 
 
 
                    
 
 
 
 
   
 
CL(NN): Clustering of the new focal outlet with other new outlets 
CL(NM): Clustering of the new focal outlet with mature outlets 
CL(MM): Clustering of the mature focal outlet with other mature outlets 
CL(MN): Clustering of the mature focal outlet with new outlets 
SO: Shared ownership of clustered outlets 
 
Note: Outlet-level sales are natural log transformed 
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FIGURE 3B 
SIMPLE SLOPES ANALYSIS FOR SIGNIFICANT INTERACTIONS  
(FRANCHISOR VS. FRANCHISEE OWNERSHIP) 
 
 
 
                    
CL(NM): Clustering of the new focal outlet with mature outlets 
CL(MM): Clustering of the mature focal outlet with other mature outlets 
 
Note: Outlet-level sales are natural log transformed 
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APPENDIX 3A 
COMPUTATION OF THE LOCAL MORAN’S I 
 
The Local Moran’s I index (Anselin 1995) estimates clustering strength or spatial 
autocorrelation of a focal outlet based on its geographic proximity from other outlets and 
its attribute similarity or dissimilarity from other outlets simultaneously.  
 
The Local Moran’s I (LMIi) for a focal outlet i can be computed as:  
 
1)    LMIi  =  
(𝑥𝑖−?̅? )
𝑠𝑖2
  ∑ 𝑤𝑖,𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖 (𝑥𝑗 − ?̅?) 
Where xi is an attribute of an outlet i, in our context, it is the age of outlet i. ?̅? is the mean 
of the corresponding attribute. wi,j is the spatial weight between outlets i and j. This 
spatial weight is based on the inverse distance conceptualization. Therefore, lesser 
distance means greater spatial weight. Finally, si
2 can be calculated as: 
 
 
2)    si
2 =  
∑  𝑤𝑖,𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
𝑛−1
 − ?̅?2 
Where n is the total number of outlets. 
 
A positive value for LMIi indicates that a focal outlet i has neighboring outlets with 
similar attributes. A negative value for LMIi shows that a focal outlet i has neighboring 
outlets with dissimilar values. In both cases, it means that the focal outlet i is part of a 
cluster. The LMIi approaches zero in case of a random spatial pattern. The LMIi is a 
relative measure and can only be interpreted within the context of its computed z-score or 
p-value. 
 
In addition to the LMIi value for each outlet, the computation of the Local Moran’s I also 
generates the cluster category of each significantly clustered outlet based on its attribute 
(i.e., in this context, outlet age). The Local Moran’s I identifies outlets with low (i.e., 
younger age) and high (older age) attribute values by using normal distribution of outlets’ 
age and categorizes them as new and mature respectively, yielding four archetypal cluster 
types. For our data, the Table below displays the age range of mature and new outlets, as 
computed by the Local Moran’s I statistic. For example, in 2004, a mature outlet was at 
least 8 years old, whereas a new outlet was at most 3 years old. 
 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Age Range for Mature Outlets 
(in years) 
 
8-27  
 
9-28 
 
9-29 
 
8-30 
 
9-31 
 
10-32 
 
11-33 
 
12-34 
 
13-35 
Age Range for New Outlets 
(in years) 
 
0-3 
 
0-1 
 
0-2 
 
0-3 
 
0-4 
 
0-5 
 
0-6 
 
0-7 
 
0-8 
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APPENDIX 3B 
THE HAUSMAN-TAYLOR INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES (HTIV) 
ESTIMATION 
Panel data lend themselves to analysis by fixed-effects (FE) or random-effects (RE) estimation 
approaches (Baltagi 2008). FE estimation yields consistent estimates but has the disadvantage 
that it does not yield any estimates for coefficients of time-invariant variables. RE estimation, 
however, leads to inconsistent estimates when the regressors are not independent of the 
unobserved individual fixed error term. Hausman and Taylor (1981) proposed an alternative 
model where some, but not all, the regressors are correlated with the individual fixed error term 
(αi) and not with random error (uit). This model is based on an instrumental variable estimator that 
uses both the between and within variation of strictly exogenous variables as instruments, and 
does not rely on external instrumental variables. 
This Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variable (henceforth, HTIV) specification splits time- varying 
(X) and time-invariant (Z) regressors into two sets of variables. The first set of regressors [X1, Z1] 
is assumed exogenous and not correlated with αi or uit, whereas the second set [X2, Z2] is 
endogenous and is correlated with αi but not with uit (Baltagi, Bresson, and Pirotte 2003).  The 
HTIV approach makes the critical assumption that some of the regressors (X) are correlated with 
the fixed error term, but not with the random error term [i.e., Cov (αi, X) ≠ 0, rather than Cov (uit, 
X) ≠ 0] (Baltagi 2008). As our analysis includes both time-varying (clustering and shared 
ownership) and time-invariant (franchisor vs. franchisee ownership) endogenous regressors, they 
need to be tested for their associations with the fixed error term (αi).  
The time-invariant endogenous regressors (Z) can only be associated with omitted fixed effects 
(αi) and not with random errors (uit) (Boulding and Christen 2003). To investigate the association 
of time varying endogenous regressors (X) with the fixed error term (αi), I use Ebbes, Bockenholt, 
and Wedel’s (2004) two-step procedure to test for Xα-dependencies. First, I specified FE and RE 
regressions for equation (2). Second, I compared both results by using the standard Hausman 
(1978) test, where the null hypothesis assumes that X and αi are independent. The significant 
result (p < .01) supported the Xα-dependencies.  
In contrast to FE estimation, HTIV estimation accommodates both time-varying and time-
invariant regressors. To retain the time-invariant variables, the HTIV pre-multiplies the model by 
Ω-1/2, where Ω is the variance-covariance term of the error component αi + uit (Baltagi 2008). This 
estimation then runs a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression using [?̃?1, ?̃?2, ?̅?1, Z1] as 
instruments (Baltagi, Bresson, and Pirotte 2003; Wooldridge 2010), where ?̃?1 and ?̃?2 are the 
deviations from means of X1 and X2 respectively, ?̅?1 is the mean of X1, and Z1 is used as an 
instrument for itself. For model identification, there must be at least as many elements in X1 as 
those in Z2. The assumption guiding this approach is that deviations from the mean of the 
explanatory variables can be validly excluded from the main equation as moment conditions,9 
which can thus be reinterpreted as exclusion restrictions. To assess the suitability of HTIV over 
FE estimation, I relied on Baltagi, Bresson, and Pirotte’s (2003) procedure. I estimated equation 
(2) using HTIV, and undertook a comparison of FE with HTIV estimates, again using the 
standard Hausman (1978) test. The non-significant result (p > .10) confirmed a preference for 
HTIV over FE estimation. My use of HTIV specification is therefore appropriate. 
                                                          
9 The moment condition refers to any variable that, when measured in deviations from the mean, is 
uncorrelated with the individual effect. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
4.1) Discussion 
 
My dissertation investigates the financial consequences of growth and geography in the 
context of business format franchising. As well, I assess the tempering impact of 
governance form on this growth-geography-performance relationship.  
 
My first essay studies the association between growth of franchise systems and 
franchisors’ terminations of franchisees, and subsequent financial performance at the 
franchise system-level. Further, essay 1 investigates the moderating effects of ownership-
based governance, royalty rate (governance), and clustering (geography) on the growth-
franchisor terminations relationship. In so doing, I am able to assess the interplay of 
growth, governance, and geography, and investigate its performance implications for 
franchise systems, both in terms of relationship terminations and its subsequent financial 
consequences. 
 
As franchised systems grow, their ability to monitor far-flung franchisee-owned outlets is 
compromised. This erosion of monitoring capability reduces the threat of terminations, 
which results in a greater propensity on the part of franchisees to shirk and thereby 
leading to more terminations. However, the manner in which growth occurs poses 
significant implications for this growth-termination association. Specifically, as 
franchisors rely to a greater extent on ownership-based governance, higher royalty rates, 
and clustering of outlets, their ability to pose a credible threat of termination of 
noncompliant franchisees increases. It is this increase in the credible threat that serves to 
dissuade franchisees from shirking, in turn, reducing the very necessity of terminations. 
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Essay 2 investigates the interplay of growth, governance, and geography and its 
performance implications for a single franchise system at the individual outlet-level. 
Focusing on clustering (geography) of outlets, essay 2 studies the evolution (growth) of a 
single franchise system from its inception in 1977 with just two outlets to its operation of 
988 outlets in 2012. Essay 2 also investigates the effect of governance – shared 
ownership (e.g., multi-unit franchisees) and franchisor vs. franchisee ownership – on this 
clustering-performance relationship. Specifically, essay 2 takes the perspective of both 
newly established and mature focal outlets; I posit and find evidence consistent with the 
notion that the opportunity to share knowledge provided by clustering may or may not be 
realized, depending on the motivation and ability of the newly established and mature 
proximal and the focal outlets to transfer and absorb knowledge, and on the governance 
context.  
 
Essays 1 and 2, therefore, complement each other by studying related phenomenon using 
two different datasets at two different levels of analysis. Whereas essay 1 studies the 
performance implications of growth, governance, and geography at the franchise system 
(macro level), essay 2 studies a similar phenomenon, but at the individual outlet-level for 
a single franchise system (micro level).  
 
Despite these complementarities, essays 1 and 2 differ from each other in several 
important dimensions. Table 1 presents these points of differentiation. Essay 1 studies 
performance implications of growth for the franchise system. It relies on a bigger sample 
comprising 75 franchise systems observed over a decade. Its unit of analysis is the 
individual franchise system. So as to deal with the potentially endogenous nature of our 
regressors (growth, ownership-based governance, royalty rate, and clustering), I use the 
endogeneity correcting control function approach (Petrin and Train 2010) to obtain 
unbiased estimates. I find that growth increases franchisor terminations of franchisees, 
but these terminations may be reduced when growth is achieved through greater reliance 
on ownership-based governance, higher royalty rate, or greater clustering of outlets. I 
further find that greater number of terminations improve franchise systems’ financial 
position in terms of sales and profitability. I attribute this to lesser shirking, higher 
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compliance, and quality provision on the part of franchisees (Bercovitz 2003; Rubin 
1990). End-customer satisfaction and repeat purchases go up (Rust and Oliver 1994; 
Taylor and Baker 1994), resulting in higher sales achieved by the franchise system. The 
costs associated with the franchisor policing of franchisee compliance with the agreement 
are also reduced (Kashyap, Antia, and Frazier 2012), thereby increasing the profitability.  
 
Essay 2 assesses the impact of clustering on outlet-level sales performance. It studies the 
evolution of a single franchise system from its inception in 1977 till 2012. Here, my unit 
of analysis is the individual outlet. I use the Hausman Taylor Instrumental Variable 
(HTIV) (Hausman and Taylor 1981) regression technique to obtain regression estimates. 
As my model includes both time-varying (clustering and shared ownership) and binary 
time-invariant (ownership-based governance) regressors, the use of the HTIV approach is 
suitable because it handles both time-varying and time-varying endogenous regressors 
and corrects for endogeneity using internal instruments.  
 
Overall, my dissertation comprises two separate research studies that fall under the same 
broad topic related to performance implications of growth, governance, and geography-
related decisions in the context of business format franchising.    
 
4.2) Practical Implications 
 
The results of the present study have important implications for franchising practitioners. 
Essay 1 indicates that franchise systems can grow faster without necessarily increasing 
the franchisor terminations of franchisees by relying on ownership-based governance, 
higher royalty rate, and greater clustering of outlets. The findings of essay 2 demonstrate 
that the impact of clustering on outlets’ sales is contingent on outlets’ experience and the 
governance context. These findings lead to practical implications for franchisors and 
franchisees, as well as for those considering investing in franchise businesses (i.e., 
potential franchisees). In what follows, I consider the implications of my dissertation for 
each of the preceding stakeholders.  
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For franchisors. My findings suggest that franchisors should rely on ownership-based 
governance, on higher royalty rates, or on clustering of outlets in their quest for growth. 
Each of the preceding mechanisms enhances the monitoring motivation and/or ability of 
franchisors, helps them detect franchisee non-compliance, in turn increasing the credible 
threat of termination of errant franchisees. This increase in the credible threat serves to 
discourage franchisees from shirking, therefore, reducing the need of terminations.   
 
Furthermore, I find that new franchisor-owned outlets lose sales when clustered with 
other outlets, regardless of whether these proximal same-brand outlets are newly 
established or mature. We ascribe this adverse effect of clustering to the lower absorptive 
capacity of newly established outlets, and their consequent inability to learn from other 
proximal same-brand outlets. When such absorptive capacity is increased, as it is in the 
case of mature outlets, the focal outlets’ sales performance is not adversely impacted by 
multiple other proximal same-brand outlets. Thus, franchisors desiring to maximize sales 
performance of their owned outlets are advised to avoid establishing new outlets in 
proximity to other same-brand outlets (regardless of whether these outlets are newly 
established or mature). For mature franchised outlets, however, our findings suggest no 
such strictures need apply. These outlets’ sales performance does not appear adversely 
impacted by proximity to other same-brand outlets. Once well-established, franchisor-
owned outlets need not fear the intra-brand competition that plagues their less well-
established counterparts.    
 
For franchisees. For franchisee-owned outlets, we would make the opposite 
recommendations. Specifically, newly established franchisee-owned outlets, rather than 
fear the intrabrand competition from mature outlets of the same brand, are well advised to 
seek them out! These new outlets are demonstrated to gain from experience of proximal 
mature outlets. It is the mature franchisee-owned outlets instead that find themselves 
facing the prospect of intra-brand competition, and losing significant amount of sales. 
 
For both franchisors and franchisees. For both franchisor- and franchisee-owned outlets, 
shared ownership of the focal and proximal outlets does appear to help facilitate 
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knowledge transfer and blunt intra-brand competition. Under shared ownership, newly 
established focal outlets clustered with mature proximal outlets outperform their 
counterparts clustered with new proximal outlets. This occurs for two reasons: first, all 
outlets, whether newly established or mature, gain from the opportunity to learn through 
direct contact (rather than solely rely on mimetic learning) from the experience of 
proximally located mature outlets under the shared ownership. Second, and as important, 
the fear of intrabrand competition is significantly mitigated by the common ownership of 
the focal and the proximal same-brand outlets.  
 
Our analysis and the subsequent calculation of sales elasticities paint a nuanced picture of 
gains and losses attributable to proximity, depending on the ownership and experience 
levels of both the focal outlet and those in its proximity. 
 
For potential investors. My findings would also be useful for someone considering 
investment in a franchise system. First, my results suggest that it is useful for investors to 
understand the growth strategy of franchise systems before investment, i.e., not just how 
much, but how such growth is achieved. Whereas franchise system growth is associated 
with more franchisor terminations, this tendency for terminations is significantly reduced 
when growth is achieved through ownership-based governance, higher royalty rate, or 
greater clustering of outlets. Each of the preceding mechanisms “shifts” the credible 
threat of termination, thereby eliciting a lower propensity for franchisee shirking. For 
those considering becoming franchisees, our findings suggest a note of caution in 
“chasing” high growth franchise systems. Although portrayed and perceived as “being on 
a tear”, such systems tend to shed greater numbers of noncompliant franchisees unless 
they rely on a higher proportion of franchisor-owned outlets, charge higher royalty rates, 
or cluster the system’s outlets. Taken together, these findings help potential franchisees 
avoid the trap of investing in franchise systems chasing unrestrained growth; rather, they 
might invest in growing franchise systems that mind how they grow. 
 
Findings from my dissertation (specifically, essay 2) suggest that potential new 
franchisees should look at the clustering pattern of existing same-brand outlets before 
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accepting a site for their new outlet. My results indicate that new franchisee-owned 
outlets perform well when clustered with mature same-brand outlets. This is likely due to 
new franchisees’ increased motivation to gain as much as possible from the experience 
gained and knowledge shared by the clustered mature outlets. Potential new franchisees 
are therefore advised to establish new outlets in proximity to mature same-brand outlets 
to gain from their accumulated experience. Further, new franchisees may also pursue 
multi-unit ownership strategy. Shared ownership of multiple outlets enhances motivation 
to share knowledge as well as dampens intra-brand competition, which positively impact 
newly established outlets’ performance. 
  
Overall, the results of this research provide much-needed guidance to franchisors, 
franchisees, and potential investors who want to better understand the performance 
outcomes of growth strategies, ownership decisions, and location choices over an 
extended period of time. 
 
4.3) Limitations 
 
My findings must be viewed in light of certain limitations. First, essay 1 uses a rich 
dataset comprising 75 franchise firms operating in multiple industries observed over a 
decade across 50 US states. These data include market-level (US state-level) locational 
information of outlets, but lack street-level address information of the individual outlets, 
precluding the estimation of clustering precisely at the individual outlet-level. Essay 2, 
however, relies on data comprising street-level addresses of outlets, enabling me to 
pinpoint the exact location of each of the 988 outlets in the sample. This dataset, 
however, comprises outlets of a single franchise system. The study of the evolution of a 
single franchise system controls for sector-specific heterogeneity, but also limits the 
generalizability of my findings. Ideally, panel data comprising multiple franchise systems 
from diverse industries with street-level outlet address information would be useful. 
 
Another limitation that seems particularly relevant is that, in both essays 1 and 2, I rely 
on unobserved conceptual mechanisms or intervening variables when specifying the 
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rationale underlying hypothesized relationships. My first essay investigates the impact of 
franchise system growth on franchisors’ terminations of franchisees, where I present my 
logic underlying the growth-terminations relationship relying on unobserved intervening 
variables – franchisors’ monitoring ability and franchisees’ compliance. Similarly, my 
essay 2 rests on the conceptual mechanism of knowledge transfer from proximal outlets 
to the focal outlet, which is unobserved. Future efforts to measure these unobserved 
intervening variables – for example, by conducting surveys with the individual outlet 
managers, or by designing laboratory experiments to provide a better understanding of 
the underlying conceptual mechanisms – and to integrate them with the archival data 
already available would add richness to the findings.  
 
A third potentially important limitation relates to my use of secondary data. My reliance 
on longitudinal archival data, while affording rich insights into actual rather than reported 
behavior, cannot speak to the motivations underlying such behavior. I rely on proxy 
variables with the assumption that the relationship between the proxy and the construct is 
reasonable, and that the observed behavior patterns are consistent with my hypothesized 
effects. Additional efforts to integrate archival data with some form of primary data (e.g., 
survey-based data) would add significant value to the research on this topic. 
 
4.4) Future Research Directions 
 
The results of this study have direct implications for research on franchising going 
forward. In essay 1, I have so far investigated the impact of growth on the relationship 
and financial performance of franchise systems. A promising avenue to explore is to 
investigate how growth might impact financial returns, especially, stock returns. Many 
franchise systems are publicly held and are followed closely by investors, who reward 
high growth firms. At the same time, franchisees of these high growth franchise systems 
may not be enamored by growth when new outlets are opened in proximity to the existing 
ones. Investigating how growing franchise systems might balance the divergent interests 
of these key stakeholders represents a potential fruitful avenue for research.     
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In essay 2, I have looked at the impact of clustering of same-brand outlets on their sales 
performance, and how this effect is tempered by outlets’ experience and the governance 
context. The focus of this study is on the same brand. In reality, it is common to find 
directly competing brands – i.e., outlets of different franchise systems belonging to the 
same industry or sector, located close to each other. These rival brands’ outlets fiercely 
compete with one another to attract customers and gain sales. Findings of this study can 
be extended by investigating the impact of such inter-brand competition along with intra-
brand competition. Specifically, we can categorize outlets based on their governance 
structure, e.g., a franchised outlet affiliated with a chain, a non-franchised outlet affiliated 
with a chain, and a non-franchised outlet not affiliated with a chain (e.g., a “mom and 
pop” store). In a particular market, a focal franchised-chain outlet may be located in 
proximity to several other outlets: 1) other same-brand franchised-chain outlets, 2) 
franchised-chain outlets of competing brands, 3) non-franchised-chain outlets of 
competing brands, and 4) non-franchised-non-chain outlets of competitors. Investigating 
the impact of clustering of these outlets on the focal outlet survival would represent a 
useful extension of my current study.   
 
In summary, my research represents a useful step in exploring the performance 
implications of growth and geography (clustering) for franchise systems at two different 
levels of analysis – at the franchise system level and at the outlet level. It further assesses 
the moderating impact of ownership-based governance. I hope that my research 
stimulates further work relating growth and clustering to different measures of franchise 
system performance and exploring further relevant boundary conditions that might shift 
this critical relationship. 
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TABLE 1 
COMPARISON OF ESSAYS 1 AND 2 
 
Dimensions 
 
Essay 1 
 
Essay 2 
Research Questions 
 
How does franchise system 
growth impact franchisor 
terminations and consequently its 
financial performance? 
 
 
How does a franchise system’s 
evolving growth pattern impact the 
individual outlets’ performance? 
Theoretical Lenses Used 
Agency Theory, Governance,  
Cluster Theory (Monitoring 
Efficiency) 
 
Cluster Theory (Knowledge 
Transfer), Intrabrand Competition, 
Governance 
 
Research Context and Data 
Collected 
75 franchise systems across 50 
US states observed from 1993 to 
2004 
 
988 outlets of a single franchise 
system across 50 US states 
observed from 1977 to 2012 
 
Unit of Analysis Franchise System Individual Outlet 
Outcome Studied 
Franchisor Terminations, Sales, 
Profit 
Outlet-Level Sales Revenue 
Predictors Included 
Growth, Ownership-Based 
Governance, Royalty Rate, 
Clustering 
 
Clustering, Shared Ownership, 
Ownership-Based Governance 
 
Endogeneity Corrected Method 
Used 
Control Function (Petrin and 
Train 2010) 
 
Hausman Taylor Instrumental 
Variable (1981) 
 
Principal Findings  
Franchise system growth 
increases franchisor terminations 
of franchisees, but growth relying 
on governance, royalty rate, and 
clustering decrease it. Greater 
number of terminations improve 
franchise systems’ financial 
performance 
 
The impact of clustering on outlet-
level sales is contingent on outlet 
experience and governance context 
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